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A Competition Law Assessment of Platform Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses 
3Õnar Akman 
forthcoming in (2016) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
 
Abstract 
Most-favoured-customer (MFC) clauses adopted by online platforms in their relevant 
contractual relationships guarantee to an online platform that a supplier will treat the platform 
as favourably as the VXSSOLHU¶V PRVW-favoured-customer concerning price, availability and 
similar terms of a given transaction. These clauses are a fundamental aspect of the business 
PRGHOVRIVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJFRPSDQLHVsuch as Apple, Amazon, Expedia, etc. The 
competition law implications of these clauses have been one of the key concerns of over a 
dozen competition authorities around the world in recent years. The competition authorities 
involved have adopted different approaches and reached different substantive and procedural 
outcomes, sometimes in proceedings that concern the application of the same legal rule to the 
same practice of the same company. This is best demonstrated by the line of investigations 
against certain online travel agents in Europe. This article posits that such diverging 
approaches lead to legal and business uncertainty, as well as to procedurally unfair and 
substantively incorrect assessments. In an effort to rectify this suboptimal situation, the article 
provides a comprehensive, principled approach for the assessment of platform MFC clauses 
under competition law ± in particular, under EU competition law. 
 
JEL Codes: K21, L41, L42 
 
I Introduction 
Most-favoured-customer (MFC) clauses (also known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
clauses) adopted by online platforms have been one of the key concerns of competition 
authorities around the world in recent years. An MFC clause is a promise by one party, for 
example, a seller, to treat a buyer as favourably as that party treats its best customer.1 When 
related to prices, the clause ensures that the customer whose contract contains an MFC clause 
will not pay a higher price tKDQWKHVHOOHU¶VµPRVW-favoured-customer¶.2 $QRQOLQHµSODWIRUP¶
can be deemed as the online equivalent of a shopping mall where buyers and sellers meet to 
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make purchases.3 MFC clauses have recently come under the scrutiny of competition law 
enforcers in the context of online platforms such as online travel agents (OTAs), price 
comparison websites (PCWs), online marketplaces, etc. These platforms include companies 
such as Amazon marketplace, iBookstore, Booking.com, Expedia, etc. When adopted by such 
platforms in their contracts with the providers or sellers seeking to reach consumers through 
the platforms, MFC clauses ensure that the provider or seller does not charge a higher price 
on one platform than it does on another platform. Thereby, the clauses ensure that the 
platform to which the promise is made gets the best price available for customers purchasing 
on that platform for the same item across platforms. Consequently, such clauses provide 
µSULFHSDULW\¶DFURVVSODWIRUPV4 
 
Currently, there are at least fourteen national competition authorities (NCAs) in Europe alone 
which are either investigating and/or have recently investigated the competition issues raised 
by such clauses. In addition, in June 2015, the European Commission opened its own 
investigation into certain practices of Amazon including MFC clauses.5 Commitments have 
been reached between some NCAs led by the authorities in France, Sweden and Italy and an 
OTA, namely Booking.com limiting the use of such clauses by Booking.com, while 
investigations into Expedia regarding the same practice continue.6 Commitments were also 
reached in the UK concerning discount parity clauses adopted by Booking.com, Expedia and 
a major hotel chain, but these have been reversed on appeal and the investigation was 
eventually closed.7 In contrast, the Bundeskartellamt in Germany has  adopted an 
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 )RUWKHVKRSSLQJPDOODQDORJ\VHHµ&DQ³)DLU´3ULFHVEH8QIDLU"$5HYLHZRI3ULFH5HODWLRQVKLS$JUHHPHQWV¶
A Report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by LEAR (OFT1438) September 2012 [6.37]; M Bennett 
µ2QOLQH3ODWIRUPV5HWDLOHUV*HQXLQH$JHQWVRU 1RQHRIWKH$ERYH"¶&RPSHWLWLRQ3ROLF\,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Europe Column 8-9. 
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&RPPLVVLRQRSHQVIRUPDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWR$PD]RQ¶V
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LQ ,WDO\)UDQFHDQG6ZHGHQ¶$SULO2Q-XO\([SHGLDKas voluntarily announced that it will 
apply the commitments that Booking.com offered and will abandon the use of parity clauses with its hotel 
partners for 5 years. See http://www.expediainc.com/news-release/?aid=123242&fid=99&yy=2015. 
Booking.com has also announced that it will apply the terms of the commitments that it entered into with the 
French, Italian and Swedish NCAs to all its hotel partners in Europe; see Booking.com, Press Release, 
µ%RRNLQJFRP WR $PHQG 3DULW\ 3URYLVLRQV WKURXJKRXW (XURSH¶ $PVWHUGDP  -XQH 
http://news.booking.com/bookingcom-to-amend-parity-provisions-throughout-europeesp.  
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 See OFT Decision Hotel Online Booking: Decision to Accept Commitments to Remove Certain Discounting 
Restrictions for Online Travel Agents, OFT1514dec, 31 January 2014 (Booking.com/Expedia/IHG) reversed on 
appeal in Skyscanner Ltd v Competition and Markets Authority [2014] CAT 16. For the announcement of the 
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infringement decision against a major OTA, namely Hotel Reservation Service (HRS) and 
against Booking.com regarding the same clauses that are the subject of the commitments 
agreed between Booking.com and the French, Swedish and Italian NCAs, whilst continuing 
its investigation against Expedia.8 Separately, after the commitments by Booking.com were 
accepted, the French Constitutional Council has adopted legislation that bans all types of 
parity clauses including the ones that were allowed under the commitments made binding 
against Booking.com by the French Competition Authority, thereby undermining the 
commitments.9  
 
The lack of action at EU level by the EU Commission has led to different NCAs in Europe 
reaching different conclusions and solutions on the basis of different approaches.10 These 
European solutions also differ from solutions adopted in other major jurisdictions, such as the 
US, in similar cases. What aggravates the current situation in the EU is that the companies 
subject to the investigations and/or the practices involved in these different cases as well as 
the applicable legal rule are practically the same. Further, the way in which some of the 
authorities have handled these clauses opens up the possibility of creating a legal anomaly in 
the laws concerning the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (such as Article 101 TFEU 
and its national equivalents). This is because the investigations of the NCAs into 
DQWLFRPSHWLWLYH µDJUHHPHQWV¶ DUH directed against only one party to the agreement and the 
                                                                                                                                       
&0$¶V FORVXUH RI WKH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ VHH 3UHVV 5HOHDVH µ&0$ FORVHV KRWHO RQOLQH ERRNLQJ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶ 
September 2015 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-closes-hotel-online-booking-
investigation.  
8
 See Bundeskartellamt HRS-Hotel Reservation Service, 9th Decision Division, B 9 ± 66/10, 20 December 2013; 
Bundeskartellamt Meistbegünstigstenklauseln bei Booking.com, 9th Decision Division, B 9-121/13, 22 
December 2015; %XQGHVNDUWHOODPW3UHVV5HOHDVHµ%XQGHVNDUWHOODPW,VVXHV6WDWHPHQWRI2EMHFWLRQV5HJDUGLQJ
%RRNLQJFRP¶V ³%HVW 3ULFH´ &ODXVHV¶  $SULO 5; %XQGHVNDUWHOODPW 3UHVV 5HOHDVH µ1DUURZ ³EHVW SULFH´
FODXVHV RI %RRNLQJ DOVR DQWLFRPSHWLWLYH¶  'HFHPEHU  DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2015/23_12_2015_Booking.com.
html. The other European countries in which these clauses are being/have been assessed from a competition law 
perspective are Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Belgium, 
*UHHFHVHH01HZPDQDQG/&URIWVµ6ZLVVWR:UDS8S+RWHO-Pricing Probe by Year-(QG¶0/([$XJXVW
DQG/&URIWVDQG01HZPDQµ%RRNLQJFRP([SHGLDWR$YRLG)XOO$QWLWUXVW6FUXWLQ\LQ*UHHFH¶0/H[
22 September 2015. 
9
 See Article 133 of LOI n° 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, l'activité et l'égalité des chances 
économiques DOVRNQRZQDVµ0DFURQ/DZ¶EDQQLQJUHVWULFWLRQVRQKRWHOLHUV¶SULFLQJIUHHGRP)RUGLVFXVVLRQ
VHH01HZPDQµ&RPPHQW)UHQFK/DZRQ+RWHOV([SRVHV&UDFNVLQ(8¶V&RPSHWLWLRQ1HWZRUN¶0/H[
August 2015. 
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 7KH RXWFRPH RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V $PD]RQ LQYHVWLJDWLRQ PD\ FOHDUO\ KDYH D VLJQLILFDQW LPSDFW RQ WKH
development of the law in this area but does not change the fact that competition authorities in the EU have 
already adopted diverging approaches with different substantive assessments and may continue to do so before 
the Commission takes any action at all against Amazon.  
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decisions taken are addressed to only one of the parties.11 Where the anticompetitive practice 
is that of an anticompetitive µagreement¶, investigating the conduct of only one of the parties 
to the agreement and addressing the decision to only one of the parties (as opposed to all of 
the parties) FUHDWHVDPLVPDWFKEHWZHHQWKHDXWKRULWLHV¶WKHRU\RIKDUPDQGWKHLUDFWLRQDQG
thereby raises questions as to whether they are operating on the basis of the correct theory of 
harm. This is because addressing the decision to one of the parties to the agreement suggests 
that the theory of harm is based on unilateral conduct, despite the legal action being pursued 
under a provision prohibiting multilateral conduct, namely DQµDJUHHPHQW¶. In fact, this article 
demonstrates that the theory of harm based on the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 
as adopted by all the NCAs in the EU dealing with these clauses is inferior to a theory of 
harm based on a potential abuse of (collective) dominance. A uniform approach to MFC and 
similar clauses adopted by online platforms that is based on the correct legal premise is 
essential for business and legal certainty for global companies operating in the online world, 
as well as for the consistent application of EU competition law rules across different Member 
States and for avoiding global divergence in competition policy concerning such prevalent 
business practices. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that platform MFC clauses are unusual MFC clauses to the 
extent that they do not correspond to the traditional scope of those clauses (see Annex for a 
diagram demonstrating the difference). Normally, by providing a promise to a buyer that the 
buyer will be treated as favourably DVWKHVHOOHU¶VPRVW-favoured-customer, MFC clauses link 
prices between different customers of the same seller. For example, the retailer Barnes and 
Noble would promise to Customer A that the price at which it sells Harry Potter to her is no 
higher than the price at which it sells Harry Potter to Customer B. The benefit of the MFC 
clause is subsequently realised by the contract party (Customer A) to whom the promise is 
made. In contrast, platform MFC clauseV DUH µWKLUG-SDUW\ DJUHHPHQWV¶ such clauses link 
prices for the same customer for purchases from different outlets. For example, the publisher 
RI+DUU\3RWWHUZRXOGSURPLVHWR$SSOHWKDWWKHSULFHRI+DUU\3RWWHURQ$SSOH¶VL%RRNVWRUH
will be no higher than the price of Harry Potter on Amazon.com. The effect of such an 
agreement between the publisher and the platform is realised on a third-party, namely the 
                                            
11
 See eg HRS (n 8); Swedish Competition Authority Decision Ref. No. 596/2013 Bookingdotcom Sverige AB 15 
April 2015. Note that the commitments were agreed between the Swedish, Italian and French competition 
authorities and Booking.com. Due to lack of availability in English of the decisions by the Italian and French 
authorities, the Swedish decision will be used throughout this article as representative of all three commitment 
decisions.  
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customer who is not a party to the agreement. To be a traditional MFC clause, the clause 
would have to create a link between the prices of the same or similar products from the same 
outlet offered to different customers rather than create a link between the price of the same or 
similar products from different outlets offered to the same customer.12 For example, in Apple, 
major publishers were practically matching the price of the same book sold to the same 
customer via different agents, where the agents (eg iBookstore and Amazon) were in 
competition with one another. Therefore, the MFC clause had the effect of matching the 
pricHVRIFRPSHWLWRUVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKHVHZHUHQRWWKHVHOOHUV¶LHSXEOLVKHUV¶EXWWKH
intermediary¶V LH DJHQW¶V FRPSHWLWRUV Thus, the categorisation of such platform parity 
clauses as MFC clauses when they are very different to genuine MFC clauses might be an 
impediment to understanding their real operation and potentially, their effects on competition. 
This is because the anticompetitive effects of µprice-matching-guarantees¶ (PMGs) which 
involve promises by a seller to match the prices of competitors for the same customer ± as 
opposed to (platform) MFC clauses ± are better established in the literature.13 Indeed, it is 
clear that the publishers involved in the US Apple litigation, thought of the MFC clause as a 
µSULFH-PDWFKLQJ¶ FODXVH.14 A worrying aspect of the ongoing decisional practice in Europe 
concerning the OTAs is that the NCAs by their decisions may have pushed the market from a 
less-anticompetitive-equilibrium to a more-anticompetitive-equilibrium due to a lack of 
understanding the differences in the operation of these different clauses. For example, in the 
commitments agreed between three NCAs and Booking.com, despite agreeing not to impose 
MFC clauses on its hotel partners, Booking.com remains free to enforce its µ%HVW 3ULFH
GuDUDQWHH¶ to consumers E\ ZKLFK LW ZLOO µPDWFK DQ\ ORZHU SULFH WKDW PD\ EH IRXQG RQ
DQRWKHUERRNLQJZHEVLWH¶± a clause that seems not to have concerned the relevant NCAs in 
their investigations.15 In fact, the commitments in question expressly allow Booking.com to 
continue the use of the PMGs which for the jurisdictions concerned, legalises these promises 
for the duration of the commitments.16 Given that Expedia and HRS also have VXFKDµ%HVW
                                            
12
 Akman and Hviid (n 2) 65. Akman and Hviid identified the discounts offered in the case of R v Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, ex p Thomson Holidays [2000] ECC 321 concerning UK tour operators, travel 
agents and package holidays to be also closer to price-matching-guarantees than MFC clauses.  
13
 Akman and Hviid (n 2) 71-72. 
14
 See United States v Apple Inc 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (SDNY 2013) 666; 672 n 38; 674. 
15
 See Booking.com Press (n 6) explaining that Booking.com will continue its Best Price Guarantee. The 
Bundeskartellamt has identified these guarantees as supporting the impact of the MFC clauses in question but 
has not banned them; HRS (n 8) [42]-[43]. 
16
 See Bookingdotcom (n 11) Commitments, Article 3. 
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3ULFH*XDUDQWHH¶17 it is likely that the competition law intervention in this market has banned 
the potentially less-anticompetitive clause (MFC clause) thereby pushing the hotels to make 
more use of their potentially more-anticompetitive clause (PMG). Instead of obliging the 
hotels to offer them the same prices, the online platforms can now use their unilateral 
promise to consumers to make the consumers (ie hotel guests) inform them of the better 
SULFHVRQRWKHUSODWIRUPVZLWKWKHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDWHYHQWXDOO\VXFKµEHWWHU¶SULFHV
will cease to exist. Subsequently, at best, the recent intervention of the NCAs in this market 
will have been without effect since they have not addressed the more disconcerting practice 
in their enforcement. At worst, they may have moved the industry closer to a potentially more 
anticompetitive equilibrium E\ IRFDOLVLQJ WKH SODWIRUPV¶ RSWLRQV where the consumers ± 
rather than the hotels ± will be used to sustain and facilitate a collusive outcome by taking 
away the possibility of using a potentially less-anticompetitive contract clause.18 These recent 
developments demonstrate how important it is to correctly understand the operation of such 
contractual clauses and subsequently, to correctly identify the optimal competition law 
assessment of these clauses in order to avoid any potential perverse outcomes. 
 
None of this is to say that PMGs or MFC clauses are always anticompetitive. However they 
are categorised, contractual clauses containing promises to buyers that they will receive the 
best price or be treated as favourably as WKH VHOOHU¶V EHVW FXVWRPHU can have both 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. At first glance, they provide reassurance to 
buyers who might be faced with certain risks in investing in a relationship with the particular 
seller and thereby facilitate trade that would not otherwise take place. In contrast, they may 
also be a mechanism that facilitates price fixing and collusion, as well as the foreclosure of 
the market due to the impossibility of entrants agreeing better deals than the deal an 
incumbent has in its contract with an important input supplier containing an MFC clause. 
                                            
17
 6HH([SHGLDµ2XU%HVW3ULFH*XDUDQWHH¶DWhttp://www.expedia.co.uk/daily/price-guarantee/default.aspx. See 
HRS website at http://www.hrs.de and http://hotelexperte.hrs.de/. 
18
 It is interesting that the OTAs appear to believe that their best price guarantees can work without MFC clauses 
being imposed on the hotels: the OTAs do not set the prices of the rooms that they sell, so it is striking that they 
can still promise to offer the consumers the best rate when surely the lowest reduction that they can offer to 
PDWFK D FRPSHWLWRU¶V UDWH ZLWKRXW VHOOLQJ EHORZ FRVW LV WKH DPRXQW RI WKHLU FRPPLVVLRQ )RU WKH GLIIHUHQW
business models of Booking.com and Expedia, see Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) 4.17 et seq. Booking.com 
operates under the commission model where the hotel guest pays the hotel directly and Booking.com is paid a 
commission off this rate by the hotel. Expedia operates predominantly under the merchant model although to a 
lesser extent it also uses the commission model. Under the merchant model, the portal offers the accommodation 
at a mark-up against the net rate paid by the portal to the hotel; the difference between the rate paid by the 
consumer and the net rate that the portal needs to remit to the hotel constitutes the revenue of the portal. It is this 
margin that can be used by the portal to offer reductions in the rate. See Bookingdotcom (n 11) [10] confirming 
that it is the hotel that decides on and uploads the prices to be displayed to consumers on the platform.  
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Such difference in potential effects coupled with the fact that platforms are two-sided markets 
with sellers on the one side and buyers on the other side render the competition law 
assessment of platform MFC clauses a complicated matter. There is a danger that on the basis 
of different theories of harm or different assumptions, different authorities around the world 
and even within the EU will reach different conclusions concerning the same practice. As this 
article will demonstrate, this has already happened to some extent and such contradictory 
treatments and outcomes cannot be conducive to legal certainty for businesses in such rapidly 
evolving markets as online markets. 
 
This article aims to propose and explain the correct application of EU competition law to 
platform MFC clauses with a view to promoting a uniform approach that would not only 
eliminate the differences between Member State applications of the same law, but also 
provide greater legal certainty to the undertakings subject to the European competition rules. 
As such, this article fills a gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive positive and 
normative analysis of platform MFC clauses under competition law and in particular, under 
EU competition law.19 In order to achieve this aim, section II provides an explanation of the 
current state of economics concerning MFC clauses, as well as similar clauses, where 
relevant. Section III examines some of the recent cases that have involved platform MFC 
clauses across different jurisdictions. Section IV critically assesses the potential application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to platform MFC clauses. It finds that although much of 
authority enforcement action concerning platform MFC clauses has been based on Article 
101 and/or its national equivalents, due to several factual and legal obstacles, such 
enforcement action should rather focus on the application of Article 102 to these clauses. The 
crux of the preference for the use of Article 102 is that, ILUVWSODWIRUPVDUHOHJDOO\µDJHQWV¶RI
the suppliers with which they enter into contracts containing these MFC clauses. This renders 
Article 101 inapplicable to these agreements since there are not two separate undertakings, 
which is essential for its applicability. Second, without market power held by at least one of 
                                            
19
 )RUWKHGHYHORSLQJOHJDOOLWHUDWXUHRQWKHWRSLFVHHHJ-3YDQGHU9HHUµ$QWLWUXVW6FUXWLQ\RI0RVW-Favoured-
&XVWRPHU&ODXVHV$Q(FRQRPLF$QDO\VLV¶-RXUQDORI(XURSHDQ&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ	3UDFWLFH$GYDQFH
Access); D Zimmer and M BlascKF]RN µ0RVW-Favoured-Customer Clauses and Two-6LGHG 3ODWIRUPV¶ 
-RXUQDO RI (XURSHDQ &RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ 	 3UDFWLFH $GYDQFH $FFHVV , 9DQGHQERUUH DQG 0- )UHVH µ0RVW
)DYRXUHG1DWLRQDO&ODXVHV5HYLVLWHG¶>@(&/596R\H]µ7KH&RPSDWLELOLW\RI0)1Clauses with EU 
&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ¶&DVH&RPPHQW(&/5,9DQGHQERUUHDQG0-)UHVHµ7KH5ROHRI0DUNHW
7UDQVSDUHQF\LQ$VVHVVLQJ0)1&ODXVHV¶:RUOG&RPSHWLWLRQ)RUWKH86SHUVSHFWLYHVHHHJ
-%%DNHUDQG-$&KHYDOLHUµ7KH Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-1DWLRQ3URYLVLRQV¶
$QWLWUXVW6&6DORSDQG)6FRWW0RUWRQµ'HYHORSLQJDQ$GPLQLVWUDEOH0)1(QIRUFHPHQW3ROLF\¶
(2) Antitrust 15. 
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the parties to the agreement such as the platform, these clauses are unlikely to raise 
competition concerns. Section V concludes by arguing that, first, from a normative point of 
view, the treatment of platform MFC clauses under Article 102 represents the more 
appropriate approach, and second, the thus-far treatment of these clauses under Article 101 
and the diverging approaches of several NCAs across Europe risk leading to inconsistent, 
incorrect and unfair outcomes with the consequent undesirable reduction in legal and 
business certainty. 
 
II Current State of Economics 
Where sellers commit to pricing policies that limit their freedom and link their prices to other 
prices charged for the same or similar competing products, these policies do not determine 
absolute price levels but set pricing relativities.20 These commitments can be across-sellers 
such as PMGs or across-customers such as MFC clauses.21 According to a report prepared for 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (now the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)), 
these clauses have the potential to both harm competition and generate efficiencies, leading to 
the conclusion that the question of whether these clauses are good or bad for consumers 
cannot receive a clear-cut answer.22 The benefit or harm to consumers depends on the 
characteristics of the market affected, the specificities of the clause and the nature of the 
seller(s) who offers it.23 A review of the economics literature suggests that the risks of 
softening competition and foreclosing new entrants are lower with across-customers clauses 
than with across-sellers price guarantees.24 In this respect, it is important to reiterate that the 
clauses that have been scrutinised as MFC clauses by the competition authorities in various 
recent investigations are in fact closer to PMGs (ie across-sellers guarantees) than genuine 
MFC clauses (ie across-customers clauses).25 It should, however, also be remarked that even 
if they are treated as PMGs, this in itself does not eliminate the potential for these clauses to 
entail procompetitive gains. As will be seen in section III, it has been confirmed by several 
NCAs in Europe that a particular type of such platform MFC clauses is vital for such 
platforms to survive as businesses.26 Finally, it should also be noted that the literature ± 
                                            
20
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.1]. 
21
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.1]. 
22
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.24]. 
23
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.24]. 
24
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.24]. 
25
 This would not be the first time that the competition authorities wrongly examined PMGs as MFC clauses. 
See Akman and Hviid (n 2) on the examination of MFC clauses that were the subject of the UK Monopolies and 
0HUJHUV&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGHFLVLRQRQIRUHLJQSDFNDJHholidays. 
26
 See text around n 116 and n 125 below. 
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including the economics literature ± on platform MFC clauses indeed examine these clauses 
as MFC clauses rather than PMGs.27 A review of the economics literature suggests that the 
potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of PMGs and MFC clauses, as well as 
other similar clauses are by their nature the same or similar with differences as to the degree 
and likelihood of the effects rather than their nature.28 
 
Regarding their procompetitive potential, MFC clauses can enable new products to enter the 
market and enhance competition.29 For example, they can be used to prevent opportunism 
where one of the parties makes relationship-specific investments to create a new product or 
improve an existing product.30 MFC clauses can also be used to deter rent-seeking delays and 
hold out problems where important market information can be discovered after some 
contracts are concluded.31 In this context, MFC clauses reduce the risks involved in making 
investments. Another efficiency argument is that MFC clauses help buyers lower their costs 
by purchasing inputs for less.32 Other efficiency arguments include that the MFC clauses 
enable buyers to get the best deals that they can;33 they provide assurance to smaller buyers 
that they would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage against bigger buyers;34 they 
reduce transaction costs by guaranteeing that the contracting party will receive the best price 
without undertaking costly negotiations;35 they SURYLGHµIDLUQHVV¶ LQJXDUDQWHHLQJWKDW LI WKH
price of the product is reduced in future, the buyer with the contractual clause can benefit 
from it, too; 36 and, they avoid the perception of unfairness that different prices might lead 
to.37 
 
                                            
27
 See in general the literature in n 19. Exceptionally, in a recent article, Buccirossi emphasises the similarities 
of platform parity clauses with across-VHOOHUVSULFLQJSROLFLHVVXFKDV30*VVHH3%XFFLURVVLµ3DULW\&ODXVHV
(FRQRPLF,QFHQWLYHV7KHRULHVRI+DUPDQG(IILFLHQF\-XVWLILFDWLRQV¶&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZDQG3ROLF\
Debate 43. 
28
 See LEAR Report (n 3) [2.15]; [3.12]. 
29
 Baker and Chevalier (n 19) 20-21; Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 15. 
30
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 15. 
31
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 15; Baker (n 1) 533. 
32
 Baker (n 1) 531. Baker argues that the greater the fraction of buyers who obtain MFC protection, and the 
larger their size, the less plausible it becomes that these clauses will help buyers obtain inputs for less; ibid. 
33
 Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsion v Marshfield Clinic 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir 1995). 
34
 EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co v Federal Trade Commission, Ethyl Corp v Federal Trade Commission 729 
F.2d 128, 134 (1984) . 
35
 Baker and Chevalier (n 19) 22. 
36
 Akman and Hviid (n 2) 61. 
37
 2QWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIXQIDLUQHVVVHHHJ/;LD.%0RQURHDQG-/&R[µ7KH3ULFHLV8QIDLU$&RQFHSWXDO
)UDPHZRUNRI3ULFH)DLUQHVV3HUFHSWLRQV¶2FWREHU-RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJ 1, 4 and ET Anderson and 
', 6LPHVWHU µ'RHV 'HPDQG )DOO :KHQ &XVWRPHUV 3HUFHLYH 7KDW 3ULFHV DUH 8QIDLU" 7KH &DVH RI 3UHPLXP
3ULFLQJIRU/DUJH6L]HV¶0DUNHWLQJ6FLHQFH 
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The anticompetitive effects of MFC clauses can be collusive or exclusionary: they can 
facilitate coordination or dampen oligopoly competition by making it impossible to offer 
selective discounts, or they can lead to exclusion by raising costs of rivals or entrants that 
attempt to compete by negotiating lower prices from suppliers of critical inputs, etc.38 MFC 
clauses can facilitate coordination since coordination works better if firms have little 
incentive to cheat to begin with and MFC clauses provide that condition by reducing the 
incentive to deviate from a coordinated horizontal agreement since the firm cannot limit its 
discounts to a single customer.39 That is, any discount given to one customer would have to 
be given to all customers with MFC clauses in their contracts, which increases the cost of the 
overall discount for the supplier.40 In short, MFC clauses could be anticompetitive because 
they create a financial incentive for the seller not to lower its prices.41 MFC clauses can also 
KDUPFRPSHWLWLRQWKURXJKH[FOXVLRQE\SUHYHQWLQJDQLQFXPEHQW¶VULYDOVLQFOXGLQJHQWUDQWV
from bargaining with input suppliers or distributors for a low price since when the suppliers 
or distributors have MFC clauses in their contracts with the incumbent, they would lose too 
much from the deal they make with a small rival or entrant.42 Although this harm to 
competitors does not in itself imply harm to competition, if the MFC clause prevents 
VXSSOLHUVRUGLVWULEXWRUVIURPJLYLQJDEHWWHUSULFHWRHQRXJKRIWKHILUP¶VVLJQLILFDQWULYDOV
(including entrants), it could be used to confer or protect market power.43 
 
As for platform MFC clauses specifically, the LEAR Report surveyed the developing 
literature and found that the most relevant competitive effects of such across-platforms parity 
agreements are likely to occur in the market where the platforms compete against each 
other.44 Possible effects that these agreements can have on platform competition include 
foreclosing entry of other platforms; softening competition between platforms; facilitating 
FROOXVLRQ EHWZHHQ SODWIRUPV DQG VLJQDOOLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW SODWIRUPV¶ FRVWV45 Such 
agreements can lead to foreclosure: if a platform ties a substantial share of sellers it can 
impede the effective entry of rival platforms.46 This is because if sellers cannot charge lower 
prices on the new platform, a new platform cannot attract buyers by providing them the same 
                                            
38
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 15.  
39
 Baker (n 1) 520. 
40
 Baker and Chevalier (n 19) 23. 
41
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 15. 
42
 Baker and Chevalier (n 19) 24. 
43
 Baker and Chevalier (n 19) 24. 
44
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.44]. 
45
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.45]. 
46
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.34]. 
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goods at lower prices.47 These agreements may foreclose entrants that are even more efficient 
than the incumbent: if the entrant were to adopt the strategy of charging a lower transaction 
fee (eg lower commission) to sellers so as to allow them to charge lower prices on the new 
platform, the incumbent¶VSODWIRUP0)&FODXVH would prevent this.48 However, sellers would 
only sign such agreements if they think that being on the platform, even with the price parity 
requirement, allows them to increase their sales more than not being on it with complete 
pricing freedom.49 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH /($5 5HSRUW µ>V@XFK VLWXDWLRQ LV PRUH OLNHO\ WKH
stronger the market power of the platform, though it may not require that the platform enjoys 
a dominant position in an antitrust sense¶.50 An across-platforms parity agreement can also 
soften competition between platforms, thereby increasing the fees paid by the sellers and 
consequently the prices charged by the sellers to the buyers.51 This is because an increase in 
fees by one platform will lead to an increase on the prices on the other platform and a 
decrease in fees by one platform will not lead to an increased market share for the same 
platform due to the parity agreements.52 Such agreements can also facilitate collusion 
between platforms.53 
 
A potential efficiency of such agreements is that they may help platforms to protect any 
investments they may have made to provide pre-purchase services to buyers (eg reviews, 
advice, etc).54 An across-platforms parity agreement may help a high-cost/high-quality 
platform to defend its quality investments by preventing other platforms from free-riding on 
them.55 If buyers use the high-cost/high-quality platform to search and then buy on a lower-
cost/lower-quality platform, the former will not be able to obtain a return from its 
investments.56 The overall effect on welfare depends on the benefits buyers obtain from the 
quality/reputation on the one side and on the possible harm due to a lower degree of 
                                            
47
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.34]. 
48
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.49]. 
49
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.51]. Another reason for which sellers might agree to these are side payments flowing 
from the platform to the retailers which would compensate the retailer for any loss of profits whilst increasing 
the overall profits; ibid [6.52]. 
50
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.51]. 
51
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.54]. 
52
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.54] et seq. This is because as a result of the platform MFC clause, the seller paying the 
higher fee will not be able to charge a higher price on the platform demanding the higher fee. Consequently, the 
seller will have to spread the higher fee charged by that platform across prices on all platforms; ibid [6.55]-
[6.56] 
53
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.62]-[6.63]. 
54
 LEAR Report (n 3) [0.37]; [6.47]. 
55
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.71]. 
56
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.72]. 
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competition among platforms on the other side.57 Moreover, there may be alternative ways 
for these benefits to be realised that would not have the same possible harm from reduced 
competition.58 A different efficiency argument also related to the prevention of free-riding 
concerns the platforms which are intermediaries whose primary function is to allow buyers 
and sellers to find the most appropriate match (eg OTAs).59 For such platforms, once the right 
match has been found, the two parties do not actually need the intermediary to conclude the 
transaction and with an intermediary charging a transaction-based fee, the parties can free-
ride on the LQWHUPHGLDU\¶V services by trading directly.60 This would threaten the entire 
business model of the intermediary and if the intermediary performs a socially efficient 
economic activity, then preventing such free-riding would constitute a valid efficiency 
justification.61 The LEAR Report finds that although the economics literature concerning 
across-sellers and across-customers price relationship agreements (PRAs) has obtained some 
sufficiently solid results that can be used to provide guidance to competition authorities, the 
same cannot be said for across-platforms parity agreements and pricing relativities.62 
 
The literature that has developed since the LEAR Report does not appear to propose 
sufficiently general results that can guide competition authorities either. Rather, it appears to 
suggest that much depends on the context and the operation of the MFC clauses adopted by 
platforms in terms of their potential effects. For example, one study finds that under certain 
conditions, such MFC clauses may raise prices, but under other conditions they may also 
increase choice for consumers without increasing prices.63 Similarly, another study finds that 
depending on the substitutability between the incumbent platform and the entrant platform, 
these clauses may increase or decrease industry profits, as well as encourage or discourage 
                                            
57
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.75]. Buccirossi calls for caution in accepting this efficiency argument since a platform 
(unlike a manufacturer imposing these restraints on retailers) benefits from reduced competition in the platform 
market. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the platform will adopt the restrictive policy only to protect 
the ancillary services that consumers value; see Buccirossi (n 27) 51. 
58
 LEAR Report (n 3) [6.75]. 
59
 Buccirossi (n 27) 51. 
60
 Buccirossi (n 27) 51. 
61
 Buccirossi (n 27) 51. 
62
 LEAR Report (n 3) [8.2]-[8.3]. 
63
 See eg Johnson suggesting that if MFC clauses are used alongside an agency model, this leads to higher 
prices, but MFC clauses do not have the same effect if the wholesale model is used. Yet, even with the agency 
model, MFC clauses may have potentially procompetitive effects when retailers face market-entry costs and 
when profit-sharing rather than revenue-sharing is used between the suppliers and retailers. This is because in 
such a scenario, their main effect is to transfer profits from suppliers to retailers, thereby increasing post-entry 
profits and thus pre-entry incentives of retailers. The differentiation between retailers thereby increases choice 
IRUFRQVXPHUVZLWKRXWDQHJDWLYH LPSDFWRQUHWDLOSULFHV-3-RKQVRQµ7KH$JHQF\0RGHODQG0)1&ODXVHV¶
Working Paper 2014 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2217849 2, 3, 4, 21, 16-19. 
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entry.64 It has similarly been argued that the same clauses can foreclose entry when the firm 
adopting them is the incumbent but they can encourage entry if the firm adopting them is the 
new entrant (and particularly so if the entrant operates a high quality/high fee business 
model).65 It has also been suggested, in line with the LEAR Report, that where neither the 
input not the output market is concentrated, coordination is less likely to be a concern even 
with MFC clauses.66 Where only one market is unconcentrated, MFCs can raise barriers to 
entry or facilitate coordination.67 In the same vein, where the MFC clauses are adopted by a 
large supplier with market power, then there is a greater concern that the MFC clauses could 
have an anticompetitive purpose and effect.68 This suggests that a case-by-case approach is 
appropriate and that any successful finding of an anticompetitive effect arising from a 
particular MFC clause has to demonstrate how this effect results from the wording of the 
clause.69 Whether the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects will dominate in a given case 
depends both on the wording of the clause and on the specifics of the industry.70  
 
III Recent Decisional Practice 
There are currently at least fourteen different European countries alone whose NCAs have 
been and/or are investigating platform MFC clauses.71 As things presently stand, some of 
these authorities have reached infringement decisions and some have accepted commitments 
in these cases. Some are still continuing investigations into the same practice adopted by 
different platforms than those which have already been subject to an investigation. 
Interestingly, there is no unified legal approach to the problem. Across the world, some 
authorities deem the same practices to be restrictions by object that are harmful to 
competition by their nature; some find them to be restrictions by effect whose anticompetitive 
effects have to be demonstrated before enforcement action can be taken; some consider them 
to be a competition law issue as horizontal practices between competitors and some consider 
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 $ %RLN DQG .6 &RUWV µ7KH (IIHFWV RI 3ODWIRUP 0)1V RQ &RPSHWLWLRQ DQG (QWU\¶ :RUNLQJ 3DSHU 2013 
available at http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/corts_17-oct-2013.pdf 2, 16. 
65
 Buccirossi (n 27) 50. Buccirossi also notes that although the platform parity clauses may effectively 
complement an entry strategy, their effects nonetheless stem from the fact that they soften competition; ibid 50-
51. 
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 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 18. 
67
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 18. 
68
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19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 Akman and Hviid (n 2) 64. 
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 Akman and Hviid (n 2) 63-64. 
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 See n 8 and text around n 6 above.  
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them to be a concern as vertical practices between undertakings on two different levels of the 
production chain. This section provides an overview of some of the recent and important 
decisional practice concerning online platform MFC clauses with a view to demonstrating the 
approach adopted by different enforcers in these cases. An analysis of the legal reasoning in 
these cases is left for section IV. 
 
A Apple  
In Apple, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and thirty-three states and US territories 
brought a civil action alleging that Apple and five book publishers conspired to raise, fix and 
stabilise the retail price for newly released and best-selling e-books.72 The publishers settled 
with the DOJ and other claimants; only Apple proceeded to trial. The US District Court of 
Southern District of New York found a per se infringement of Sherman Act, Section 1. The 
violation was that Apple facilitated a conspiracy between publishers to raise certain e-book 
prices, particularly by eliminating the price reductions offered by Amazon. Key to the 
violation was the move from the existing wholesale model ± where the publisher received the 
wholesale price for a book and the retailer set the retail price ± to an agency model ± where 
the publisher set the retail price and the retailer sold the book as WKHSXEOLVKHU¶V agent.73 The 
agreements Apple entered into with the publishers also included MFC clauses which required 
that publishers match in iBookstore any lower retail price of an e-book offered by any other 
e-book retailer.74 It must be noted that Apple was a new entrant on the e-book market at the 
time ± in fact, it had not yet entered the market ± and according to Apple, without the security 
provided to it by the MFC clauses, it could not have entered and/or survived on this market, 
where Amazon practically had a monopoly and was potentially using certain books as loss-
leaders.75 Yet, the Court FRQFOXGHG WKDW $SSOH¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH PDUNHW EURXJKW OHVV
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 Apple (n 14) 645. 
73
 Apple (n 14) 648. 
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 Apple (n 14) 662, 664. 
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 See eg Apple (n 14) 698; 699-700; 700; 701; 708. See also US v Apple Inc $SSHOODQW$SSOH,QF¶V2SHQLQJ
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when used by the entrant (as opposed to the incumbent) platform MFC clauses can encourage entry (despite 
simultaneously softening price competition), see Buccirossi (n 27) 50-51. 
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competition and higher prices,76 which implies that a less concentrated market is worse than a 
monopoly.77 Apple has appealed the judgment without success.78 The majority on the US 
Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of per se infringement whereas the dissent argued that 
given the vertical relationship between Apple and the publishers, the per se rule could not 
apply to the case as it is reserved for horizontal restrictions of competition.79 
 
In the EU, concerning the same practices, the EU Commission opened proceedings against 
the book publishers and Apple, all of whom have offered commitments which were made 
binding in 2012 and 2013.80 ,Q LWV 3UHOLPLQDU\ $VVHVVPHQW WKH (8 &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
competition concerns related to a concerted practice between and among the publishers and 
Apple in relation to a common global strategy for the sale of e-books with the aim of raising 
retail prices or avoiding lower retail prices.81 In their commitments, Apple and publishers 
have agreed to terminate the relevant agency agreements and abandon the use of MFC 
clauses in their agreements. 
 
B  Booking.com, Expedia and IHG 
In 2014, the OFT accepted commitments from two major OTAs (Expedia and Booking.com) 
and a major hotel chain (the largest hotel company in the world, IHG) which removed the 
restrictions on the offering of discounts on room prices by OTAs.82 In its SO, the OFT had 
alleged that the parties had entered into arrangements which restricted the OTAV¶DELOLW\ WR
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 Apple (n 14) 708. 
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 The Dissenting Opinion in the appeal of the judgment also seems to find this proposition odd in arguing that 
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discount the rate at which room-only hotel accommodation bookings were offered to 
consumers.83 It had alleged that the agreements between OTAs and the hotel chain under 
which the OTA agreed to offer accommodation at that chain at a day-to-day room rate set 
and/or communicated by the hotel chain and not to offer rooms at a lower rate constituted 
agreements and/or concerted practices which had the object of preventing, restricting, or 
distorting competition under UK Competition Act, Chapter I and Article 101.84 In the 
commitment decision, the OFT explained its competition concerns as a restriction of intra-
brand competition and a possible increase in barriers to entry that result from the restrictions 
on discounting.85 The MFC clauses involved in the agreements provided that a hotel would 
provide an OTA with access to a room reservation (for the OTA to offer to consumers) at a 
booking rate which is no higher than the lowest booking rate displayed by any other online 
distributor.86 Such MFC clauses have not been considered by the OFT and are not subject of 
the commitments, save to the extent that such clauses could prevent either hotels or OTAs 
from offering such discounts as are allowed for by the commitments. This prevention could 
be indirect, for example, if a hotel is required to offer an OTA the same discounted booking 
rate as the hotel or another OTA is offering to closed group customers.87 A third-party price-
comparison website (Skyscanner) successfully appealed the commitments at the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal (CAT) and the case was remitted to the CMA which eventually decided to 
close the investigation in September 2015.88 
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 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) 1.3. The Statement of Objections has not been published. See OFT Press 
µ2)7LVVXHV6WDWHPHQWRI2EMHFWLRQVDJDLQVW%RRNLQJFRP([SHGLDDQG,QWHUFRQWLQHQWDO+RWHOV*URXS¶-XO\
2012. 
84
 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) 5.1-5.3. 
85
 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) 1.4. In their commitments, the parties agreed that OTAs will be free to offer 
UHGXFWLRQVRIIKHDGOLQHURRPUDWHVWRPHPEHUVRIDµFORVHGJURXS¶ZKHUHWKHHQG-user making the booking has 
joined a closed group and has made a single previous booking with that OTA; ibid 1.9. With the commitments, 
KRWHOVZLOODOVREHIUHH WRRIIHU UHGXFWLRQVRII WKHLURZQKHDGOLQHUDWHV WRFORVHGJURXSPHPEHUV LELG µ,QWUD-
EUDQGFRPSHWLWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWRXWOHWVVHOOLQJWKHVDPHEUDQGSURGXFWHWFZKHUHDV
µLQWHU-brand competitiRQ¶ UHIHUV WR FRPSHWLWLRQ EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW EUDQGV SURGXFLQJ VLPLODU FRPSHWLQJ
products. 
86
 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) 1.10 n 9, 4.16.  
87
 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7DQGQ7KH2)7¶VFRPPLWPHQWVKDYHEHHQGHVFULEHGDVDµKXJH
IDLOXUHLQDVVHVVPHQW¶E\WKHFRPSODLQDQWVNRRVKFRPZKRVHIRXQGHUKDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHFRQGLWLRQVLPSRVHGE\
WKH 2)7 ZRXOG UHLQIRUFH %RRNLQJFRP RU ([SHGLD¶V GRPLQDQFH DQG ZRXOG GLscourage new consumers from 
using smaller, unknown websites rather than Booking.com or Expedia: consumers would not want to pay for a 
full-UDWH URRP WRTXDOLI\ IRU WKHGLVFRXQW URRPV IURPDQHZZHEVLWH VXFKDV6NRRVK6HH36WHSKHQV µ2)7
moves to try to ERRVWFRPSHWLWLYHKRWHOGHDOVRQOLQH¶-DQXDU\ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
25975746. 
88
 CAT [2014] CAT 16. The appeal was successful on the grounds that the commitments will have adverse 
effects on the meta-search sector and/or inter-brand competition (particularly due to reduced price transparency 
resulting from the establishment of closed groups) and the OFT did not properly take this concern into account 
before accepting the commitments; ibid [6], [63], [100]. The CAT also found that the OFT had acted irrationally 
in reaching its decision; ibid [159]. At the appeal, the CMA argued that the main reason why the restriction on 
disclosure was so important was because of the prevalence of rate parity obligations (MFC clauses) which were 
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C Price Comparison Websites 
In its market investigation, the CC defined a PCW as an Internet platform that facilitates the 
buying and selling of motor insurance.89 The CC categorized MFC clauses used by PCWs 
LQWR WZR EURDG W\SHV µZLGH¶ DQG µQDUURZ¶90 Wide MFC clauses specify that the premium 
may not be lower on any other PCW or RQWKHLQVXUHU¶VRZQZHEVLWHDQGLQVRPHFDVHVLQ
any sales channel at all); narrow MFC FODXVHVVSHFLI\WKDWWKHLQVXUHU¶VRZQZHEVLWHZLOOQRW
offer policies at a lower premium than available on the PCW.91 In its investigation, the CC 
found that narrow MFC clauses (ie clauses providing SDULW\EHWZHHQ3&:DQGLQVXUHU¶VRZQ
website) may be necessary for PCWs to survive.92 CMA, which has taken over the market 
investigation from the CC, has banned price parity agreements between PCWs and insurers 
(wide MFC clauses) which stop insurers from making their products available to consumers 
elsewhere more cheaply, while allowing the PCWs to continue the use of narrow MFC 
clauses.93  
 
The CC found that wide MFC clauses soften price competition between PCWs: with a wide 
MFC clause in place, a PCW does not face the possibility that a retail customer will find the 
same policy more cheaply on a competing PCW.94 There is little incentive for a PCW facing 
a competitor with a wide MFC clause to seek better prices for their retail consumers from 
insurers because that better price would be passed on to the competitor also.95 There is, 
therefore, little reward for price reductions. Conversely, a PCW with a wide MFC clause 
need not be concerned when it raises commission fees. It is safe in the knowledge that this 
                                                                                                                                       
often triggered by the display of public rates for hotel rooms; ibid [139]. This begs the question why the OFT 
did not directly tackle the MFC clauses in its decision to accept commitments. For the announcement of the 
&0$¶VFORVXUHRIWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQVHH&0$3UHVV5HOHDVHQ7).  
89
 &RPSHWLWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQ µ3ULYDWH 0RWRU ,QVXUDQFH 0DUNHW ,QYHVWLJDWLRQ¶ 3URYLVLRQDO )LQGLQJV 5HSRUW
(December 2013) [4.21] (PCW). On the PCWs market the CC identified that some of the contracts between 
insurers and PCWs contained conditions that limited price competition, reduced innovation and restricted entry; 
ibid Summary [6]. The CC found the PCWs to constitute a distinct market; ibid Summary [34]. The CC 
identified two features of the market that have an adverse effect on competition: i- information asymmetries 
between motor insurers and consumers in relation to the sale of add-ons; and ii- the point-of-sale advantage held 
by motor insurers when selling add-ons; ibid Summary [65]. 
90
 PCW (n 89) Summary [73]. 
91
 PCW (n 89) Summary [73]. 
92
 PCW (n 89) Summary [82]; [9.68]-[9.79]. 
93
 &0$ µ3ULYDWH 0RWRU ,QVXUDQFH 0DUNHW ,QYHVWLJDWLRQ 2UGHU ¶  0DUFK  DYDLODEOH DW
https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5509879f40f0b613e6000029/Order.pdf.  
94
 PCW (n 89) Summary [74]. 
95
 PCW (n 89) Summary [74]. 
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will not make sales through its channel less competitive compared with sales through other 
PCWs.96 Narrow MFC clauses will not usually have the same impact on competition because 
they maintain the possibility of premiums varying on different PCWs.97 In fact, the CC 
considered that narrow MFC clauses, but not wide ones, may be necessary for the survival of 
PCWs as a business model. A narrow MFC provides some credibility to the proposition that 
the policies found on the PCW cannot be purchased more cheaply simply by going to the 
website of the provider. Without that reassurance, consumers would learn that PCWs could 
not be trusted to be a better alternative to direct search and demand for their services might 
disappear.98 For a search among insurers to be valuable to the retail consumer ± and to 
contribute to rivalry among insurers ± it must return the identity of the seller, and so 
necessarily has to return the information needed by the consumer to bypass the PCW and go 
to the direct website. Without narrow MFC clauses there is a risk that retail consumers might 
undermine the business models of PCWs.99 The insurance providers could free-ride on the 
advertising that PCWs provide and narrow MFCs provide reassurance to consumers that the 
SULFHV RQ 3&:V FDQQRW EH EHDWHQ E\ VHDUFKLQJ GLUHFWO\ RQ LQVXUHUV¶ ZHEVLWHV100 The CC 
found that PCWs enhance rivalry in the insurance market.101 A risk to the existence of PCWs 
from the absence of narrow MFC clauses would therefore be damaging to competition.102 The 
CC also found that there was no alternative way for PCWs to provide customer assurance on 
their truthfulness regarding the statements on price (ie credibility for PCWs), although there 
were alternative mechanisms other than MFCs to prevent free-riding by insurers.103 
 
 
 
D HRS 
                                            
96
 PCW (n 89) Summary [74]. 
97
 PCW (n 89) Summary [75]. The CC identified one special case in which narrow MFC clauses can lead to a 
substantial softening of price competition but found that this applies only for brands which are listed both on 
PCWs and on a strong direct sales channel, and whose competitiveness against PCW channels the insurer 
wishes to maintain. They found that the number of brands meeting these conditions is small; ibid Summary [75]. 
98
 PCW (n 89) Summary [80]. 
99
 PCW (n 89) Summary [81]. 
100
 PCW (n 89) [9.70], [9.74]. 
101
 PCW (n 89) Summary [82]. 
102
 PCW (n 89) Summary [82]. 
103
 PCW (n 89) [9.77]-[9.79]. The CC further noted that PCWs have a degree of market power by virtue of the 
number of single homing consumers (ie, consumers who do not shop around between PCWs); ibid Summary 
[6]. According to the CC, about 23 per cent of all business is conducted through PCWs and about 55 to 60 per 
cent of new business comes through PCWs; ibid Summary [68]. According to the CC, under the agency pricing 
model where insurers set prices to final consumers while PCW-to-insurer negotiations set commission fees, 
MFC clauses directly constrain the prices consumers pay; ibid [9.29]. 
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In HRS, the Bundeskartellamt took action against a leading online hotel portal in Germany 
(with worldwide operations), namely HRS, concerning the use of MFC clauses similar to 
those identified (but not directly investigated) by the OFT in Booking.com, Expedia and IHG. 
These MFC clauses agreed with hotel partners required that the hotel guaranteed that the 
HRS price was at least as low as the cheapest rate offered by or for the hotel on other online 
booking and trDYHOSODWIRUPVDVZHOODVWKHKRWHO¶VRZQZHESDJHV104 In case the MFC clause 
was breached, the agreement provided that HRS could bar the hotel in question immediately 
or temporarily prevent it from receiving further bookings.105 According to the 
Bundeskartellamt, the MFC clauses obliged the hotel partners to adjust the prices of their 
hotel rooms on other portals at the same level as at HRS and prevented the hotels from 
passing on lower commissions of other portals to customers.106 Somewhat contradictorily, 
whiOH WKH 2)7 IRXQG UHVWULFWLRQV RQ WKH 27$V¶GLVFRXQWLQJ IUHHGRP LPSRVHG E\ WKH KRWHO
partner to be anticompetitive in Booking.com, Expedia and IHG (implying that prices should 
be set freely by the OTAs), in HRS WKH %XQGHVNDUWHOODPW KHOG WKDW µ>S@ULFH VHWWLQg should 
DOZD\VEHGHFLGHGE\WKHKRWHOVVLQFHWKH\EHDUWKHVDOHVULVN¶107 
 
The Bundeskartellamt chose to impose fines over accepting commitments which it 
considered were inadequate for two reasons: they were time limited and thus incapable of 
permanently eliminating the serious concerns of the Authority; and, they would have had no 
precedence effect.108 The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf has upheld the 
BundeskarWHOODPW¶V GHFLVLRQ109 HRS has not appealed to the Federal Court of Justice, and 
Bundeskartellamt has sent an SO to Booking.com for the same conduct in April 2015, whilst 
also continuing its investigation into Expedia for the same type of conduct.110 Following its 
decision in HRS, in December 2015, Bundeskartellamt adopted a prohibition decision against 
Booking.com finding the same clauses that the French, Italian and Swedish competition 
authorities found to be legal under commitments offered by Booking.com (namely, narrow 
parity clauses) to be anticompetitive.111 This is returned to below in Section III.E. 
                                            
104
 HRS (n 8) [30]; [40]. 
105
 HRS (n 8) [32]; [41]. 
106
 HRS (n 8) [185]. 
107
 HRS (n 8) [167]. 
108
 HRS (n 8) [14]. 
109
 Case VI-Kart 1/14 (V) ± HRS ± Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, 9 January 2015.  
110
 See Bundeskartellamt Press Release (n 8).  
111
 Booking.com had already ceased using the wide parity clauses in Germany in line with its commitments to 
the French, Italian and Swedish competition authorities. For the infringement decision, see Booking.com (n 8). 
%RRNLQJFRP KDV DSSHDOHG WKHGHFLVLRQ WR WKH+LJKHU5HJLRQDO&RXUW RI'VVHOGRUI VHH µ%RRNLQJFRP &KHI
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E Booking.com 
In December 2014, Booking.com offered commitments to the French, Swedish and Italian 
competition authorities which were investigating the MFC clauses found in the agreements 
between Booking.com and hotels in their jurisdictions.112 By the initial commitments offered, 
Booking.com undertook to remove the pricing parity clause from its contracts which oblige 
hotels to offer Booking.com conditions that are at least as favourable as those offered on 
competing platforms.113 After market testing, commitments were revised by Booking.com 
and in April 2015 these commitments were made binding on Booking.com for a period of 
five years from 1 July 2015.114 Interestingly, the commitments require Booking.com to 
abandon the MFC clauses thDW VHHN SDULW\ ZLWK %RRNLQJFRP¶V FRPSHWLWRUV DQG WKDW VHHN
SDULW\ZLWKWKHKRWHOV¶RZQoffline sales.115 This means that Booking.com will still be free to 
impose MFC clauses that seek parity between the prices on Booking.com and the online 
prices offered by the hotels themselves (on the hotel website, etc).116 Thus, similar to the 
                                                                                                                                       
kritisiert das BundeskartHOODPW¶ :LUWVFKDIWV :RFKH  $SULO  DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/dienstleister/hotelportal-booking-com-chef-kritisiert-das-
bundeskartellamt/13416882.html. 
112
 )RUWKHFRPPLWPHQWSURSRVDOVHH$XWRULWHGHODFRQFXUUHQFH3UHVV5HOHDVHµ2QOLQH+RWHO%RRNLQJ6HFWRU¶
(English version) 15 December 2014. 
113
 Press Release (n 112). Booking.com had further offered to extend this commitment to all EEA countries; 
ibid. 
114
 Bookingdotcom (n 11) (n 11) 
115
 Bookingdotcom (n 11) [40]. Offline sales are those that do not involve the use of the Internet, such as those 
made in person at the reception, over the phone, or at a bricks and mortar travel agency; ibid Commitments, 
Article 9. 
116
 Bookingdotcom (n 11) (n 11) [41]. As noted above, recent legislation in France bans all types of MFC clauses 
in the hotels market and therefore, the commitments are arguably no longer valid in France; see n 9 above. In 
the commitments decision, the Swedish Competition Authority noted that Booking.com and the hotels do not 
operate on the same relevant market; ibid [16]; [25]. The same view is held by the Bundeskartellamt in HRS 
VLQFH WKH $XWKRULW\ IRXQG WKDW µ>W@KH ZHEVLWH RI KRWHOV RIIHULQJ UHDO-time booking are not part of the same 
SURGXFWPDUNHWDVKRWHOSRUWDOV¶DQGWKDWWKHKRWHOZHEVLWHVDUHQRWVXEVWLWXWHVIRUKRWHOSRUWDOVVLQFe the former 
do not offer the same bundles of services as hotel portals; HRS (n 8) [88]. The Bundeskartellamt also noted that 
µ>W@KHVDOHRIKRWHOURRPVYLDKRWHOV¶RZQZHEVLWHVFDQQRWEHFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHVDOHFKDQQHOVIRUIOLJKWVYLDWKH
RZQZHEVLWHVRIDLUOLQHV¶ LQUHODWLRQ WR WKHKROGLQJRI WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ WKDW WUDYHOZHEVLtes offering 
IOLJKWV DUH VXEVWLWXWHV IRU DLUOLQHV¶ RZQ ZHEVLWHV VHH HRS (n 8) [90] and Case COMP/M.6163 Commission 
Decision AXA/ PERMIRA/OPODO/GO VOYAGES/EDREAMS, C(2011) 3913 final, 30 May 2011 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6163_20110530_20310_1852583_EN.pdf 25 et seq. 
Although these findings of the Swedish, Italian and French authorities and of Bundeskartellamt regarding the 
relevant market somehow explain why the Swedish, Italian and French authorities did not deem the clauses 
seeking parity between the OTAs and hotelV¶RZQZHEVLWHVWREHDSUREOHPDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUQRWEHLQJRQWKH
VDPHPDUNHWWKH\DUHSDUWLFXODUO\QRWHZRUWK\LQUHODWLRQWRWKH%XQGHVNDUWHOODPW¶VDSSURDFKZKLFKEDQQHGDOO
W\SHVRISDULW\FODXVHVLQFOXGLQJWKRVHFRYHULQJ27$VDQGKRWHOV¶RZQZHEVites and which also found that the 
parity clauses of OTAs restrained competition between the hotels on various online channels as well as offline 
channels (see HRS (n 8) [164]; [169] et seq). For a different perspective, see Flight Centre Limited v Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission [2015] FCAFC 104 for a decision of the Full Court of Australia on 
appeal finding that a travel agent selling airline tickets does not compete with the airlines in a market for 
distribution and booking services; [8]. This followed from the fact that the travel agent supplied any booking 
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decision of the UK Competition Commission (CC) (now the CMA) in Price Comparison 
Websites examined above, clauses providing parity between the online prices of the platform 
and the principal (ie narrow parity clauses) were not found to be a competition concern in the 
assessment of the Swedish, French and Italian competition authorities. Oddly, the implication 
of the commitments for consumers is that should they wish to make use of any more 
advantageous rates, they will need to contact hotels individually by phone or in writing which 
not only increases the costs of search and transaction for a consumer who is savvy and wishes 
to receive a better price, but also defies the convenience of having PCWs in the first place 
since the consumer would have to contact hotels separately to make use of their potentially 
better offline rates. As mentioned above, the authorities in accepting these commitments do 
not seem to have been concerned about the potentially more anticompetitive promise, namely 
WKH µ%HVW3ULFH*XDUDQWHH¶RIIHUHG WR FRQVXPHUV E\ %RRNLQJFRP DQG LQ IDFW KDYH OHJDOO\
endorsed this promise by including in the commitments a provision that allows Booking.com 
to continue using these promises.117 
 
Interestingly, the Bundeskartellamt sent an SO to Booking.com on 2 April 2015 before the 
announcement of the acceptance of the commitments concerning the same conduct by the 
French, Swedish and Italian NCAs on 10 April 2015. According to Bundeskartellamt, 
following the fact that MFC clauses such as those in question have been determined to be 
DQWLFRPSHWLWLYHE\D ILQDO MXGJPHQWRI DFRXUW LQ*HUPDQ\ LQSURFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW+56 µD
less stringent course of acWLRQ DJDLQVW WKH PDUNHW OHDGHU %RRNLQJFRP¶ (ie accepting 
commitments) did not appear to be the right approach in Germany.118 In the infringement 
decision against Booking.com that followed, similar to its decision in HRS, the 
Bundeskartellamt prohibited all types of MFC clauses including those that seek parity 
between the price on HRS DQG WKH SULFH RQ WKH KRWHO¶V RZQ online channels such as the 
KRWHO¶VZHEVLWe.119 In contrast, the commitments accepted by the French, Italian and Swedish 
NCAs allow Booking.com to continue imposing such MFC clauses that seek parity between 
WKHSULFHRQ%RRNLQJFRPDQGWKHKRWHOV¶RQOLQHFKDQQHOVThus, Booking.com is obliged to 
adopt different arrangements regarding its MFC clauses in contracts with its hotel partners in 
different EU Member States (a position further complicated by  the new legislation in France 
                                                                                                                                       
VHUYLFHVDVDQµDJHQW¶RIWKHDLUOLQHVRQEHKDOIRIWKHDLUOLQHVLELG>@&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHDJHQW¶s attempts to 
induce the airlines into a price fixing agreement was not an anticompetitive agreement; ibid [182]. 
117
 See Bookingdotcom (n 11) Commitments, Article 3.  
118
 See Bundeskartellamt Press Release (n 8).  
119
 See HRS (n 8) [30]. 
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banning all types of MFC clauses120) despite the fact that the competition provisions that all 
these national authorities are applying and the conduct under investigation are practically 
identical. It might also be the case, as argued by Booking.com, that the company is subjected 
to different legal arrangements in markets with no materially different characteristics that 
would justify adopting such different approaches.121 
 
IV The Assessment of Platform MFC Clauses under Articles 101 and 102 
This section provides a legal assessment of platform MFC clauses with a view to establishing 
their correct legal treatment from a competition law perspective. The assessment is both 
positive and normative: whilst explaining the recent competition law treatment of these 
clauses, the analysis points out the deficiencies of this treatment before moving onto 
assessing how these clauses should be treated. The main focus is EU competition law with 
reference also to US antitrust law where relevant, but the principles derived from the analysis 
are valid for any competition law that has similar provisions to those found in EU and US 
competition laws (namely, a rule prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and a separate rule 
prohibiting anticompetitive unilateral conduct).  
 
At the EU level (as opposed to the national level), in terms of theories of harm in the existing 
case law, the predominant competition concern arising from price parity clauses has been 
foreclosure: matching competition clauses adopted by dominant undertakings in their 
contracts or included in a vertical agreement by an undertaking with significant market power 
have been deemed likely to lead to foreclosure.122 Foreclosure was the main concern also in 
most cases where the across-customers PRAs were considered to be a means to ensure that 
competitors could not obtain a key input at better conditions.123 In Europe, the legal treatment 
of MFC clauses is that there is a strict position when these are combined by a dominant 
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 6HH µ%RRNLQJFRP $QQRXQFHV ,QWHQW WR $SSHDO %XQGHVNDUWHOODPW 5XOLQJ¶  'HFHPEHU  DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/bookingcom-announces-intent-to-appeal-bundeskartellamt-ruling-
563356891.html.  
122
 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co v EC Commission [1979] ECR 461; Case COMP/13.133 ± Soda 
Ash ± Solvay (2003/6/EC); Case COMP IV/29.021 - BP Kemi ± DDSF (79/934/EEC) cited in LEAR Report (n 
3) [7.8]. In the US, MFC clauses have been analysed both from a foreclosure and a softening 
competition/collusion perspective; see LEAR Report (n 3) [7.7]. 
123
 LEAR Report (n 3) [7.9] with reference to Case COMP/38307 E.ON Ruhrgas - Gazprom and Digitisation of 
European cinemas QRWLFHRIFORVXUH LQ(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ3UHVV5HOHDVH µ$QWLWUXVW&RPPLVVLRQFORVHV
prREH LQWR +ROO\ZRRG VWXGLRV DIWHU WKH\ FKDQJH WHUPV RI FRQWUDFWV IRU GLJLWLVDWLRQ RI (XURSHDQ FLQHPDV¶
IP/11/257, 4 March 2011). 
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player with loyalty mechanisms, such as rebates.124 The only EU case in which collusion has 
been explicitly considered is Hollywood Studios, about which no documentation other than a 
press release is available.125 In the US, at the time of the LEAR Report, no antitrust case on 
across-sellers PRAs was decided and regarding MFC clauses, the approach is one of rule of 
reason.126 Consequently, unless they are adopted by an agreement among competitors, MFC 
clauses are normally evaluated under the rule of reason in the US.127 
 
In contrast foreclosure rather than collusion being the main concern regarding MFC clauses 
in EU case law, in all of the recent cases concerning platform MFC clauses the NCAs 
involved have adopted a theory based on collusion. As such, Article 101 and/or its national 
equivalent on anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices have been the legal 
provision used to investigate and/or prohibit the relevant MFC clauses. This section seeks to 
show that this choice of legal provision is unfortunate for several reasons. Moreover, the 
section seeks to establish that from a normative perspective Article 102 and/or its national 
equivalents on the prohibition of abuse of dominance is the more appropriate legal provision 
with which to scrutinise the MFC clauses in question.  
 
A Assessment as an anticompetitive agreement or concerted practice 
In terms of the legal assessment of platform MFC clauses, the first issue that one faces is 
whether these clauses are covered by Article 101 at all due to the potential argument that 
SODWIRUPVDUHµDJHQWV¶RIVXSSOLHUVZLWKWKHLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWDJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQWKHPDQGWKH
suppliers are not covered by Article 101 for failing to be DJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQµWZRRUPRUH
XQGHUWDNLQJV¶,IWKH\DUHIRXQGWREHFRYHUHGE\$UWLFOHWKHVHFRQGLVVXHWKDWDULVHVLV
whether they should be treated as horizontal or vertical practices. Finally, a further question 
arises as to whether they should be treated as restrictions by object or by effect.  
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 LEAR Report (n 3) [7.16]. The situation is less clear in cases with non-dominant undertakings, particularly 
when the incumbent cannot ascertain who is making the competing offer; ibid [7.17]. 
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 LEAR Report (n 3) [7.9]. Similar to the case law, few references to PRAs are found in EU soft law, which 
also arguably reflects the main concern as being foreclosure, ibid [7.10]. For example, the Verticals Guidelines 
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between suppliers. 
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127
 Salop and Scott Morton (n 19) 17. 
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i. Are platform MFC clauses covered by Article 101 at all? Genuine agency 
The first ± and potentially formidable ± hurdle that needs to be overcome regarding the 
assessment of platform MFC clauses under Article 101 (as well as under Sherman Act, 
Section 1) UHODWHVWRWKHIDFWWKDWSODWIRUPVPD\OHJDOO\EHµDJHQWV¶RIWKHVXSSOLHUVZKRVHOO
on the platforms. For the purposes of EU FRPSHWLWLRQODZDQµDJHQW¶LVDµOHJDORUphysical 
person vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another 
SHUVRQWKHSULQFLSDOHLWKHULQWKHDJHQW¶VRZQQDPHRULQWKHQDPHRIWKHSULQFLSDO¶IRUWKH
purchase (sale) of goods/services (supplied) by the principal.128 The implication of platforms 
EHLQJµDJHQWV¶LVWKDWWKHSODWIRUP0)&FODXVHVZRXOGQRWbe covered by Article 101 at all. 
This is because Article 101 does not apply to agreements between principals and genuine 
agents. This stems from the doctrine according to which Article 101 does not apply to 
DJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQWZRRUPRUHOHJDOSHUVRQVWKDWIRUPDµVLQJOHHFRQRPLFHQWLW\¶VLQFHWKH
application of the provision requires an agreement between separate undertakings.129 In the 
same vein, Sherman Act, Section 1 does not apply to agreements within a single entity and 
this doctrine can cover agreements between a principal and an agent under certain 
circumstances.130 The particular significance of the agency exception in the EU is that under 
Regulation 1/2003, Member States are obliged not to prohibit agreements and concerted 
practices by their national competition rules if the same practice is not prohibited in EU 
FRPSHWLWLRQODZSURYLGHGWKDWWKHUHLVDQµHIIHFWRQWUDGHEHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶131 There 
is an effect on trade between Member States in the recent cases concerning the platform MFC 
clauses adopted by, for example, the OTAs with the implication that if the agency exception 
means that these clauses are not prohibited under EU competition law, then they cannot be 
SURKLELWHG E\ WKH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKHLU GRPHVWLF FRPSHWLWLRQ ODZV HLWKHU132 
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This raises questions concerning, for example, the compatibility of the Bundeskartellamt 
decision in HRS with EU law obligations arising out of Regulation 1/2003. 
 
In CEPSA, the Court of Justice (CoJ) reaffirmed that vertical agreements are covered by 
Article 101 only where the operator (agent) is regarded as an independent economic operator 
and there is thus an agreement between two undertakings.133 The Court noted that the formal 
separation between two parties resulting from their separate personality is not conclusive, the 
decisive test being the unity of their conduct on the market.134 Agents can lose their character 
as independent traders only if they do not bear any of the risks resulting from the contracts 
negotiated on behalf of the principal and they operate as auxiliary organs forming an integral 
SDUWRI WKHSULQFLSDO¶VXQGHUWDNLQJ135 Thus, the key issue is whether the agent assumes the 
financial and commercial risks linked to sales or the performance of contracts entered into 
with third parties.136 Examples provided by the CoJ are the risks relating to costs of 
distributing the SURGXFWVPDLQWDLQLQJVWRFNDW WKHDJHQW¶V H[SHQVHDVVXPLQJ UHVSRQVLEility 
for any damage caused to/by the products by/to third parties; investments specifically linked 
to the sale or advertising of goods, etc.137 In short, in order to determine whether Article 101 
is applicable, the allocation of the financial and commercial risks between the principal and 
the agent has to be analysed on the basis of such criteria as stipulated by the CoJ.138 The 
Court also noted that the fact that the intermediary bears only a negligible share of risks does 
not render Article 101 applicable.139  
 
Some of the NCA decisional practice discussed above have explicitly considered agency as 
an issue whereas some others have only indicated factors that suggest platforms might be 
agents. For example, in Booking.com/Expedia/IHG the OFT noted that OTAs do not take title 
or hold inventory to hotel accommodation.140 This suggests that the OTAs are the agents of 
hotels. Similarly, in PCW the CC noted that PCWs are not wholesalers of insurance ± they do 
not set retail prices: PCWs earn a commission on insurance policies that are sold through 
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their intermediation.141 Again, this suggests that PCWs are agents. In contrast, the 
Bundeskartellamt explicitly founG+56QRWWREHDJHQXLQHDJHQWµEHFDXVHWKH>0)&@FODXVHV
do not bring about any restraints of competition which emerge from a principal ± in this case 
the hotel partners ± EXW IURP WKH DJHQW +56¶142 However, with respect, in the legal 
assessment of whether the relationship is one of agency, the source of the restraint (which is 
the conduct under investigation) cannot be the correct, relevant criterion. Whether the 
relationship between two companies is one of agency should be decided on the basis of 
objective factors concerning that relationship such as ownership; price-setting power; risks 
involved; etc rather than who the source of a restraint is. 0RUHRYHULQWKH%XQGHVNDUWHOODPW¶V
GHFLVLRQWKDWVRXUFHLVVWDWHGWREH+56ZKLFKKDVµXQLODWHUDOO\¶GHFLGHGWRDPHQGWKHJHQHUDO
terms and conditions.143 This begs the question how any one party can unilaterally modify a 
contract ± such unilateral modification would have to involve either so-FDOOHG µeconomic 
duress¶, or possibly abuse of a dominant position.144 According to the Bundeskartellamt, the 
hotel partners do not exert influence on the activities of HRS since they do not make demands 
on HRS either relating to the sales area or to the customers, nor do they influence further 
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activities of HRS.145 $FFRUGLQJO\µ>W@KHDFWLYLWLHVRI+56GRQRWGHSHQGRQWKHKRWHOSDUWQHUV
of HRS. The [MFC] clauses do not restrict the conduct of the alleged agent, but rather that of 
WKHDOOHJHGSULQFLSDO¶146 Yet, it must still be the principal (ie hotel owner) who carries the 
risk of not selling a particular room. According to the Bundeskartellamt, HRS is not a 
dependent agent since it bears its own financial and economic risk.147 Examples given to 
support this position are HRS investment in advertising the HRS brand; establishing a 
network with hotels and cooperation partners; developing the HRS website; cooperating with 
Internet providers; etc.148 However, this confuses the fact that the agency business has its own 
costs and risks itself as a business with the decision on whether the business acts as an agent 
of another party in a given transaction with a third party: the mere fact that the agency 
business has costs cannot disqualify the business from being an agency.149  
 
In HRS, the Bundeskartellamt noted that HRS is similar to a travel agent with reference to 
VVR and HRS does not act in the interest of a single principal, but sells rooms for more than 
250,000 different hotels worldwide.150 In VVR the CoJ had found that a travel agent that sells 
travel organised by a large number of different tour operators where the tour operator also 
sells through a very large QXPEHURIDJHQWVPXVWEHUHJDUGHGDVDQµLQGHSHQGHQWDJHQWZKR
SURYLGHV VHUYLFHVRQDQ HQWLUHO\ LQGHSHQGHQWEDVLV¶151 In contrast, the Verticals Guidelines 
indicate that it is not material for the assessment whether the agent acts for one or several 
principals.152 2QHFRPPHQWDWRUQRWHV WKDW WKH&RXUW¶VDVVHVVPHQW LQVVR should be correct 
from an initial economic viewpoint since when a firm is an agent to multiple, competing 
principals, it will be difficult to perfectly satisfy all their wishes simultaneously and these 
demands will require the agent to make its own independent decision regarding which 
SULQFLSDOV¶ LQVWUXFWLRQ WR SULRULWLVH RYHU RWKHUV153 If the agent is making such independent 
decisions, then ceteris paribus, it will be more difficult to argue that it is a genuine agent 
because it acts as a single economic unit with the principal. However, there is an important 
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difference in the factual scenario between the operation of a brick-and-mortar travel agent as 
was the type in VVR and that of an OTA or other online platform. Although in the brick-and-
PRUWDUW\SHWKHDJHQWKDVVRPHVFRSHIRULQIOXHQFLQJWKHFRQVXPHU¶VGHFLVLRQRQWKHEDVLVRI, 
for example, which transaction will render the highest commission for the agent, in the online 
platform situation, the platform has no real scope for such influence. Unless the results are 
manipulated by the platform, the platform presents to the consumer the full list of, for 
example, KRWHOVWKDWPHHWWKHFRQVXPHU¶VSUHIHUHQFHVRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWKDWWKH 
consumer provides and at the same time also displays full information on price, location, etc. 
The decision is ultimately made by the consumer with no input from the platform unlike the 
situation with, for example, a brick-and-mortar travel agent.154 Thus, irrespective of how 
many hotels are represented on the platform, the platform does not make any decision as to 
whose orders should be prioritised in promotion efforts, etc since by definition, the search 
results display the full list of hotels that meet thHFRQVXPHUV¶SUHIHUHQFHVDQGLWLVXOWLPDWHO\
the consumer that makes the choice between the different principals.155 Thus, the analogy 
with a brick-and-mortar travel agent as adopted by the Bundeskartellamt is not appropriate 
given the factual context of online platforms.156 
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In DaimlerChrysler, the General Court (GC) decided that where an agent, although having 
separate legal personality, does not independently determine his own conduct on the market, 
but carries out the instructions of his principal, Article 101 does not apply to the relationship 
between the agent and the principal.157 According to the GC, where the principal sells the 
product and takes, on a case-by-case basis, the decision to accept or reject the orders 
negotiated by the agent, the agent has extremely limited commercial freedom in relation to 
the sale of products: the agent is thus not in a position to influence competition on the market 
in question, which in DaimlerChrylser was the retail market for Mercedes passenger cars.158 
The GC gives the example that if a customer orders a product but the sale does not proceed, 
the financial implications and thence the risks associated with the transaction remain with the 
principal, as well as all the risks associated with non-delivery, defective delivery and 
customer insolvency, etc.159 Overall, it is the principal which determines the conditions 
applying to all sales, in particular the sale price, and which bears the main risks associated 
with that activity.160 Consequently, the agent sells the products in all material respects under 
the direction of the principal, with the result that he should be treated in the same way as 
employees and considered as integrated in that undertaking and thus forming an economic 
unit with it.161 This conclusion was not undermined by the fact that the agents were required 
to undertake certain activities and assume certain financial obligations under the agency 
agreement.162 Contrasting this with the situation of Mercedes-Benz dealers in Spain and 
Belgium, the Court noted that an independent dealer is in a position to determine, or at the 
very least to influence, the terms on which the sales are made, as he is the seller, who bears 
the main share of the price risk in the vehicle and who maintains a stock of the vehicles.163 It 
is that negotiating margin of the dealer, which comes between the manufacturer and 
customers, that exposes the dealer to a risk that Article 101 might apply to his relationship 
with the manufacturer.164 In the case of online platforms, for example, OTAs, the platform 
does not bear any risks associated with the transaction, for example, the sale not proceeding 
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(ie the hotel guest does not honour the booking) or customer insolvency (ie the hotel guest 
cannot pay). Most importantly, the platform does not set the price (ie the rate for the hotel 
room).165 All the important parameters of the transaction with the third party are determined 
by the principal who also bears all the risks related to that transaction. 
 
According to the Verticals Guidelines, the determining factor in defining an agency 
agreement for the application of Article 101 is the financial or commercial risk borne by the 
agent in relation to the activities for which it has been appointed as an agent and it is 
immaterial for the assessment whether the agent acts for one or several principals.166 For the 
purposes of applying Article 101, the agreement will be qualified as an agency agreement if 
the agent does not bear any or bears only insignificant risks in relation to the contract 
concluded and/or negotiated on the behalf of the principal, in relation to market-specific 
investments for the field of activity, and in relation to other activities required by the 
principal to be undertaken on the same product market.167 The risks that relate to the activity 
RI SURYLGLQJ DJHQF\ VHUYLFHV LQ JHQHUDO VXFK DV WKH ULVN RI WKH DJHQW¶V LQFRPH EHLQJ
dependent upon its success as an agent or general investments in premises or personnel, are 
not material to this assessment.168 Thus, an agreement will be generally considered an agency 
agreement where property in the contract goods does not vest in the agent or the agent does 
not himself supply the contract services and where the agent does not contribute to the costs 
relating to the supply of goods/services; does not maintain at its own cost or risk stock of the 
contract goods; does not undertake responsibility towards third parties for damage caused by 
WKHSURGXFWGRHVQRWWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFXVWRPHUV¶QRQ-performance of the contract, with 
the exception of WKH ORVV RI WKH DJHQW¶V FRPPLVVLRQ LV QRW REOLJHG WR LQYHVW LQ VDOHV
promotion; does not make market-specific investments in equipment, premises, personnel, 
etc; does not undertake activities within the same product market required by the principal, 
unless they are fully reimbursed by the principal; etc.169According to the Guidelines, since 
the principal bears the commercial and financial risks related to the selling and purchasing of 
the contract goods and services, all obligations imposed on the agent in relation to the 
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contracts concluded and/or negotiated on behalf of the principal fall outside Article 101(1).170 
As one of the obligations that will be considered an inherent part of an agency agreement, the 
*XLGHOLQHV QRWH µWKH SULFHV DQG FRQGLWLRQV DW ZKLFK WKH DJHQW PXVW VHOO RU SXUFKDVH¶ WKH
contract goods/services.171  
 
Considering the case law and the principles set out in the Verticals Guidelines, the online 
SODWIRUPV FRQVLGHUHG LQ WKLV DUWLFOH DSSHDU WR EH OHJDOO\ µDJHQWV¶ IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI
competition law. This is because platforms do not buy the products from the suppliers to 
resell it to consumers; they do not set the price of the products; they do not bear any of the 
risks related to not selling the products other than lack of receiving a commission; they do not 
bear any of the risks related to the sale of the products to the consumers; they get 
remunerated by the suppliers when a sale is concluded with the consumer; they do not make 
market-specific investments or invest in sales promotion for particular goods, etc.172 All in 
all, crucially, platforms do not assume any financial or commercial risks related to the sales 
or performance of the contract with third parties. The implication is that the relationship 
between the third party and the platform cannot be legally explained in any other way than 
that the platform acts as the agent of the principal in that transaction with the third party.  
 
According to the Verticals Guidelines, there are two situations in which Article 101 might 
become applicable to the clauses agreed between a principal and an agent. In other words, 
there are two exceptions to the rule that Article 101 does not apply to the relationship 
between a principal and an agent. Only one of these exceptions is relevant to the subject 
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   -RXUQDO RI &RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ DQG (FRQRPLFV  663. Offering a different 
perspective, Zhang remarks that the appropriate inquiry when discerning genuine agency should focus on the 
EXVLQHVVMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUWKHSDUWLHV¶DGRSWLRQRIWKHDJHQF\PRGHOWKHUHDOTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUDJHQF\UDWKHU
than distribution is a more efficient contractual form for the parties, ie whether they would choose the 
contractual form of agency instead of distribution in the absence of a desire to get around the competition rules; 
$+=KDQJµ7RZDUGDQ(FRQRPLF$SSURDFKWR$JHQF\$JUHHPHQWV¶-RXUQDORI&RPSHWLWLRQ/DZ
and Economics 553, 576, 590. To the extent that the literature is built on the premise that the agent is physically 
selling/distributing a product, it does not apply to a sale that takes place over an online platform as a result of the 
context and nature of online transactions. 
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matter of this article.173 An agency agreement may infringe Article 101 where the agency 
agreement facilitates collusion.174 The examples provided for such collusion are situations 
where a number of principals use the same agents while collectively excluding others from 
using these agents, or where they use the agents to collude on marketing strategy or to 
exchange sensitive market information between the principals.175 Thus, the MFC clauses 
adopted in the contracts between platforms and suppliers could be challenged under Article 
101 ± despite the fact that platforms are agents ± provided that they facilitate collusion 
between the principals. Interestingly, in the context of this article, this would require proof of 
facilitating collusion between suppliers (eg hotel owners) rather than collusion between 
platforms (eg OTAs) who are agents. This is akin to the situation in the US Apple litigation, 
but is much removed from the situation in the current and ongoing European cases where the 
theory of harm relates to the competition between the agents (ie the platforms) and not the 
principals (ie the hotels, insurance companies, etc). Thus, the exception provided in the 
Guidelines does not neatly provide support to the European cases but the Guidelines only 
provide examples and it can be envisaged that a competition authority could use the 
Guidelines to support a case of collusion between platforms in seeking to bring these 
agreements within the scope of Article 101. In any case, this would be done through 
establishing an exception to the rule that these agreements are not covered by Article 101 and 
would require proof of collusion (amongst platforms or amongst suppliers) which has not 
been the case thus far in the recent investigations in Europe. Consequently, the recent 
European investigations have all been based on erroneous legal grounds in applying Article 
101 to agreements between a principal and its agent, and are in breach of the applicable EU 
law. 
 
ii. Are they horizontal (inter-brand) restrictions or vertical (intra-brand) 
restrictions? 
                                            
173
 7KHRWKHUH[FHSWLRQUHODWHVWRWKHIDFWWKDWVLQFHµWKHDJHQWLVDVHSDUDWHXQGHUWDNLQJIURPWKHSULQFLSDO¶WKH
relationship between the agent and principal may infringe Article 101. In particular, provisions preventing the 
agent from acting as an agent or distributor to undertakings which compete with the principal and post-term 
non-compete provisions, which concern inter-brand competition, may infringe Article 101 if they lead to or 
contribute to a cumulative foreclosure effect on the relevant market where the contract goods or services are 
sold or purchased; Verticals Guidelines (n 125) [19]. Thus, to the extent that any clauses such as MFC clauses 
between a platform and the supplier does not relate to the relationship between the platform and the supplier as 
such or contribute to or lead to a cumulative foreclosure effect on the relevant market where the contract goods 
or services are sold or purchased (eg the hotels/e-books/motor insurance market as opposed to the platform 
market), this is not relevant for the platform MFC clauses under examination. 
174
 Verticals Guidelines (n 125) [20]. 
175
 Verticals Guidelines (n 125) [20]. 
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Given that the recent decisional practice has disregarded the agency exception to the 
application of Article 101 to agreements, this article will continue to investigate the other 
problems related to the application of Article 101 to platform MFC clauses. One of these 
issues is whether these clauses should be treated as horizontal or vertical restrictions, a matter 
on which different authorities around the world have demonstrated different approaches. For 
example, in Germany, the Bundeskartellamt prohibited these clauses as vertical restraints in 
HRS.176 Similarly, in the UK, such clauses adopted by insurance PCWs were treated as 
vertical restraints in PCW.177 In Sweden, France and Italy the commitments accepted in 
Booking.com also suggest that the theory of harm in these Member States was based on a 
vertical restraint.178 Strikingly, in HRS as well as in Booking.com the authorities have dealt 
with the platforms individually rather than collectively by addressing their decisions to a 
single undertaking. This requires further elaboration.  
 
Had the theory of harm related to a horizontal restriction, one would have expected the 
authorities to consider commitments from all the platforms together since a horizontal 
anticompetitive practice could only effectively be brought to an end if all the parties to the 
practice (ie all the horizontal competitors) changed their practices. For example, the 2)7¶V
commitments in Booking.com/Expedia/IHG were indeed addressed against both platforms, 
namely Booking.com and Expedia. Yet, the fact that the hotel group IHG was also an 
addressee of the decision and that WKH FRQGXFW LQ TXHVWLRQ FRQFHUQHG WKH µVHSDUDWH 
DUUDQJHPHQWV¶WKDW%RRNLQJFRPDQG([SHGLDµHDFKHQWHUHGLQWR¶179 again suggests that the 
theory of harm was based on a vertical restraint (ie between Booking.com and IHG, and 
Expedia and IHG) rather than a horizontal one (ie between Booking.com and Expedia which 
was facilitated by IHG).180 Indeed, the OFT QRWHGWKHVHWREHµYHUWLFDODUUDQJHPHQWVEHWZHHQ
KRWHOVDQG27$V¶LQLWVGHFLVLRQ181 What is noteworthy is that in its commitments decision, 
the Swedish Competition Authority, after qualifying the relevant agreements as vertical 
agreements, went on to note that it is the horizontal parity (ie parity between prices offered by 
different OTAs) rather than the vertical parity (ie parity between prices offered by a hotel and 
                                            
176
 HRS (n 8) [10]. 
177
 PCW (n 89) Section 9. 
178
 See Bookingdotcom (n 11 >@ IRU WKH $XWKRULW\¶V EULHI GLVPLVVDO Rf the application of VBER which 
suggests that they treat the contracts containing the MFC clauses as vertical agreements. 
179
 See Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) [1.3]. 
180
 See Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) [1.3]. 
181
 Booking.com/Expedia/IHG (n 7) [3.1]. 
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by an OTA) that negatively affects competition.182 Similarly, according to the 
Bundeskartellamt, the economic effect of MFC clauses is similar to direct collusion between 
hotel portals, namely concerted behaviour regarding the sale of a specific room at a specific 
minimum price.183 This is most interesting because the legal instruments used suggest that the 
Bundeskartellamt as well as the Swedish Competition Authority perceived the case to be one 
of vertical restraints (hence, the discussion of Verticals Block Exemption Regulation 
(VBER), etc in the decisions).184 Yet, the underlying theory of harm appears to be a 
horizontal one of collusion. Yet again, the decision is only addressed to HRS or Booking.com 
individually, which constitutes only one of the parties to this arguably collusive horizontal 
arrangement, and not to the other allegedly colluding parties at the same time.  
 
The problem of the addressee persists irrespective of whether the restrictions in question are 
deemed to be horizontal or vertical agreements: one would expect the decision to be 
addressed WRDW OHDVW WZRSDUWLHVWRDQµDJUHHPHQW¶ (or to more parties in the case of a hub-
and-spoke arrangement) LI WKH DQWLFRPSHWLWLYH SUDFWLFH LQ TXHVWLRQ LV DQ µDJUHHPHQW or 
concerted practice¶ falling under Article 101 and/or its national equivalents. None of the 
authorities other than the OFT and the US DOJ have pursued their investigations of these 
µDJUHHPHQWs¶DJDLQVWDOOWKHSDUWLHVWRWKHDJUHHPHQWDQGQRQHRIWKHPKDYHDGGUHVVHGWKHLU
decisions to all the parties to the agreement. This risks creating an anomaly in the application 
of competition law: enforcement of Article 101 and/or its national equivalents revolves 
DURXQGDQµDJUHHPHQWRUFRQFHUWHGSUDFWLFH¶WKDWPXVWKDYHPRUHWKDQRQHXQGHUWDNLQJSDUW\
to it since otherwise it would QRW EH DQ µDJUHHPHQW RU FRQFHUWHG SUDFWLFH¶185 Thus, if the 
                                            
182
 Bookingdotcom (n 11) [20], [24]. 
183
 HRS (n 8) [157]. 
184
 Commission Regulation 230/2010 on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices [2010] OJ L102/1 (VBER). 
For the discussion of the VBER, see eg HRS (n 8) [177] et seq; Bookingdotcom (n 11) [18]. 
185
 In defence of the Bundeskartellamt and the other authorities, it should also be noted that the Commission 
itself has on occasions addressed such decisions concerning an infringement of Article 101 to only one of the 
undertakings to the agreement concerned rather than to all; see eg Case C-74/04 P Commission v Volkswagen 
AG [2006] ECR I-6586. In BMW this policy of the Commission (ie that of addressing the decision to all parties 
to an agreement in some cases and to only one party in other cases) was found not to infringe the principle of 
non-discrimination by the CoJ; Joined Cases 32/78, 36/78 to 82/78, etc BMW Belgium SA and others v EC 
Commission [1979] ECR 2435, [52]-[53]. It must also be remarked the cases in which the Commission chose to 
address the decision to only one of the infringing undertakings concerned dealership agreements between car 
manufacturers and dealers where a certain degree of economic dependence existed between the two groups. The 
relationship between online portals and their suppliers cannot be deemed equivalent to the relationship between 
a car manufacturer and dealers whose main source of income is dependent on the success of their relationship 
with the manufacturer. In the UK, the possibility of the CMA addressing its infringement decision to fewer than 
all of the parties to the agreement is stipulated in The Competition Act 1998 (Competition and Markets 
$XWKRULW\¶V5XOHV2UGHU6,1R$UWLFOH 
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theory of harm is based on a practice falling under Article 101 and/or its national equivalents, 
investigating the practices of individual undertakings followed by decisions addressed to 
individual undertakings does not fit within the framework of the legal provision.186 It is 
impossible to understand (and remains unexplained by the relevant authorities) why the 
decisions are not addressed to the platforms and their contracting partners (ie the hotels) or to 
all the relevant platforms adopting the same clauses which thereby lead to the alleged 
restriction/distortion of competition in these cases by using µDJUHHPHQWV¶ that fall under 
Article 101. The correct legal instrument to use for unilateral practices of individual 
undertakings is Article 102 and/or its national equivalents prohibiting the abuse of a 
dominant position. As will be argued below, the exercise of unilateral market power is indeed 
the correct and better tool to use in these investigations. The current approach of the 
authorities mixing and matching vertical and horizontal as well as unilateral and multilateral 
theories of harm with the wrong legal instruments is an undesirable development in 
competition law which should not stand judicial scrutiny. 
 
                                            
186
 The Bundeskartellamt explains its decision to treat the issue in HRS as one concerning an anticompetitive 
µDJUHHPHQW¶E\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH$XWKRULW\KDVIRXQGWKHDJUHHPHQWVLQTXHVWLRQWREHFRYHUHGE\WKHH[SUHVVLRQ
LQ WKH9HUWLFDOV*XLGHOLQHV WKDW µDJUHHPHQWV¶ DOVR FRYHU H[SUHVVLRQVRI ZLOO ZKLFKSURYLGH IRU RU DXWKRULVH D
company to adopt unilateral conduct which is binding on the other company; HRS (n 8) referring to Verticals 
Guidelines (n 125) [25]. There are several problems with this interpretation of the Guidelines and potentially 
with the statement in the Guidelines itself. For a start, at face value, by this expression the Bundeskartellamt 
appears to accept that the conduct in question is unilateral which begs the question why the Authority did not 
consider pursuing the conduct as a unilateral practice under Article 102 in the first place. Second, the expression 
in the Guidelines is more complicated than presented in HRS. The Guidelines stLSXODWHWKDWµ>L@QFDVHWKHUHLVQR
explicit agreement expressing the concurrence of wills, the Commission will have to prove that the unilateral 
SROLF\ RI RQH SDUW\ UHFHLYHV WKH DFTXLHVFHQFH RI WKH RWKHU SDUW\¶ 9HUWLFDOV *XLGHOLQHV Q 125) [25](a). This 
clearly does not cover the situation in HRS since in that case, there was an explicit agreement expressing the 
concurrence of wills found in the shape of the contracts between HRS and hotels. Thus, this was not a situation 
in which the stipulated paragraph of the Guidelines was applicable. In the presence of such an explicit 
agreement, the correct legal approach would have been to address the decision to all parties to that agreement. 
Moreover, it is difficult to explain why the hotel partners were not worthy of prosecution for breach of 
competition law if they did indeed acquiesce to the demands of HRS. Furthermore, where the hotel partners are 
resisting and opposing the imposition of such clauses, it is also difficult to argue that the hotel partners 
acquiesced to the unilateral policy of HRS, which legally would leave one with only a unilateral policy and not 
an agreement in any sense that would render the application of Article 101 possible. That the hotels were not 
willingly acquiescing to the policy of HRS is evidenced by their non-compliance with the MFC clauses and the 
threats they received from HRS in order to ensure compliance; see eg HRS (n 8) [60]; [32]; [34]; [41]; [39]. As 
IRUWKHUHIHUHQFHWRVXFKXQLODWHUDOSROLF\EHFRPLQJDQµDJUHHPHQW¶E\DFTXLHVFHQFHRIDQRWKHUSDUW\LWPXVWEH
noted that the judgment to which the Guidelines refer to in support of this legal point actually involved the 
annulment of a Commission decision in which the Commission had found that Volkswagen had breached 
Article 101 by way of an agreement (which was erroneously established on the basis of circulars and letters sent 
to its dealers concerning the pricing of a particular vehicle model); Volkswagen (n 185). Moreover, the question 
of acquiescence in the absence of relevant contractual provisions was not elaborated on by the CoJ in 
Volkswagen as it was not relevant to the case; ibid [46]-[47]. Furthermore, the judgment to which Volkswagen 
refers to in making the particular legal point is a judgment addressed to BMW Belgium and forty-seven Belgian 
BMW dealers which signed a circular that constituted an agreement breaching Article 101 by imposing an 
export ban; see BMW (n 185).  
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In contrast to some of the NCAs in the EU, in Apple, the US District Court and the majority 
on the US Court of Appeals found Apple liable under the per se rule rather than rule of 
reason despite the relationship between Apple and the relevant publishers being a vertical 
one: according to the court, the agreement was, at root, a horizontal price restraint subject to 
per se analysis.187 The Court found that Apple directly participated in a horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy and relied on MFC clauses in the agency agreements as proof of horizontal 
price-fixing.188 Consequently, its practices were explicitly treated as a horizontal restriction 
that was entered into not just by Apple but by Apple and the relevant publishers, hence the 
action being pursued against the publishers and Apple together unlike the national cases in 
the EU pursued against individual platforms. Interestingly, as noted above, the EU 
Commission, in accepting commitments from Apple and five publishers for the same 
practices that were the subject matter of the US District Court judgment, treated 
(preliminarily) the conduct to be a concerted practice with the aim to increase the price of the 
SXEOLVKHUV¶SURGXFWVLHe-books). This suggests that there is a clear horizontal element in the 
(8&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHDVRQLQJDVZHOO, despite the fact that it is not entirely clear whether the 
concerted practice is purely horizontal, or a mix of horizontal and vertical elements. 
 
There is a stark difference between the horizontal theory of harm as pursued in Apple and the 
theory of harm underlying the investigations of the European NCAs into platform MFC 
clauses. This difference is important because ± apart from the problem discussed above 
concerning the use of wrong legal instrument ± depending on whether the clauses are treated 
as vertical restraints or horizontal restraints, the legal treatment of the clauses will involve 
different assessments. Particularly in the EU, their treatment as vertical restraints opens up 
the possibility of their being covered and exempted by the VBER. Similarly, economic 
thinking on when and how vertical restraints can harm competition is substantially different 
to when and how horizontal restraints can harm competition. Part of the difficulty in 
establishing whether they are horizontal or vertical agreements is due to the fact that the 
platforms are two-sided markets: they offer their services to two different customer groups 
                                            
187
 Apple (n 14) 706-707; Apple (appeal) (n 77) 71 et seq. Cf Dissenting Opinion (n 77) 15-16. 
188
 Apple (n 14) 706-707. In its appeal, Apple argued that far from being part of the conspiracy, publishers 
DFWLYHO\UHVLVWHGWKH0)&$SSOH,QF¶V2SHQLQJ%ULHIQ757KHOHJDOEDVLVRI$SSOH¶VRQJRLQJDSSOLFDWLRQ
WR WKH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW WR UHYLHZ WKH 86 &RXUW RI $SSHDOV¶ MXGJPHQW LV WKDW per se liability was wrongly 
imposed since the practice in question was vertical; see Apple Inc v United States of America an others, 
No.15A015A301 in the Supreme Court of the United States, Application for Extension of Time Within Which 
to File a Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit, 16 
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and indirect network effects exist between the two groups.189 The network effects imply that 
the value of the services of the platform for one customer group depends on the number of 
members of the other group.190 This two-sided nature of the markets inevitably puts the 
platforms in a vertical relationship with their suppliers and customers, but platforms also 
compete with other platforms and they are in a horizontal relationship with these other 
platforms. Therefore, any agreement between a platform and a supplier can have effects on 
that vertical relationship between them and/or on the horizontal relationship between the 
platforms.191 What is important is that economics suggests that vertical restraints should be 
treated more leniently than horizontal restraints due to their potential procompetitive effects 
and a key factor in the potential harmful effects of vertical restraints is the holding of market 
power by at least one of the parties to the vertical restraint.192 The need for market power 
arises from the economic argument that restrictions of inter-brand competition are more 
important in terms of a restrictive effect on competition and where inter-brand competition is 
strong (ie there is no market power), restrictions of intra-brand competition should be less of 
a concern.193  
 
Regarding the decisional practice discussed above, the horizontal infringement theory in 
Apple VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH 'LVWULFW &RXUW¶V FRQFHUQ ZDV LQWHU-brand competition, namely 
competition between different publishers which in turn implies competition between different 
titles. Yet, interestingly, in Apple the competition issue potentially related to intra-brand 
competition rather than inter-brand competition because any given book has (and can 
technically have) only one publisher at one time and the scrutinised practices concerned the 
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 See Zimmer and Blaschczok (n 19) 1 and references in n 3. 
190
 Zimmer and Blaschczok (n 19) 1. 
191
 In his dissenting opinion in Apple-XGJH-DFREVDUJXHGWKDW$SSOH¶VFRQGXFWVKRXOGKDYHEHHQWUHDWHGDVD
vertical restraint since Apple was not in competition with the publishers; it was only in competition with 
Amazon and its agency agreements including the MFC clauses was a legitimate means of competing with 
Amazon; see Dissenting Opinion (n 77) 21-23. In the literature, Fletcher and Hviid (n 4) 17 et seq argue that this 
mix of horizontal and vertical effects is common with these clauses, if implicit. 
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 For the economics literature on vertical restraints, see eg M Motta Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 32, 343, 348; S Bishop and M Walker The Economics of EC Competition 
Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (3rd ed Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 190 et seq; This is the rationale 
behind the market share threshold of the VBER; see VBER (n 184) Article 3. 
193
 See eg Bishop and Walker (n 192  7KLV LV DOVR WKH SRVLWLRQ DGRSWHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 9HUWLFDOV
Guidelines; see Verticals Guidelines (n 125) [102], [153], [177]. Cf eg Cases 56 and 58/64 Etablisssements 
Consten SaRL & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 342 which does not display such a 
position but is focussed on the single market imperative and barriers to trade. On the position that restrictions of 
inter-brand competition are more problematic for competition than vertical restrictions in the online platform 
context, see Bookingdotcom (n 11) [20]. In the US, horizontal restrictions of competition are per se unlawful 
under Sherman Act Section 1 whereas vertical restraints are subject to the rule of reason analysis meaning that 
they are unlawful only if an assessment of market effects reveals that they unreasonably restrain trade; Apple 
(appeal) (n 77) 51. 
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price of individual books sold on different outlets, which presumably had no relevance for 
inter-brand competition (ie, competition between publishers for different titles or competition 
between different titles). This is because the competition between, for example, Harry Potter 
and the Da Vinci Code as different titles and the competition between publishers to be able to 
receive the right to publish such titles presumably remain unaffected by restrictions 
concerning the price of an individual title agreed between a publisher and a retailer. Taking 
the example further, it is difficult to imagine that consumers would decide to buy the Da 
Vinci Code if the price of Harry Potter went up. This means that the book titles (and therefore 
the publishers) do not compete on price against each other since they are not substitutable, 
particularly in the relevant market in Apple which comprised new releases and best-sellers (in 
other words, a subset of titles across all genres rather than a particular genre of books). In 
Apple WKHSXEOLVKHUGHIHQGDQWV¶&(2VQRWHG WKDW WKHSXEOLVKHUVGLGQRWFRPSHWHZLWKHDFK
other on price, but rather on authors and agents.194 It is indeed accepted by the District Court 
in Apple that there is no evidence that the publishers have ever competed with each other on 
price.195 Yet, the entire judgment and theory of harm in Apple turn on the increase in prices of 
the books rather than any other aspect of competition. This suggests that there is a disjoint 
between the theory of harm and the legal tool used as well as the facts of the market in Apple 
similar to the recent European cases concerning platform MFC clauses: the judgment treats 
books as homogenous/substitutable products and the publishers as producers of 
homogenous/substitutable products who compete on price, which is clearly not true on the 
facts.196  
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 Apple (n 14) 651. 
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 In the literature, Fletcher and Hviid suggest that retail price MFC clauses can be seen as equivalent to the 
worst of RPM and should not be treated any less harshly than RPM: if RPM is to be seen as an infringement by 
object under EU competition law, then so should retail price MFCs; Fletcher and Hviid (n 4) 32. They define 
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relates to the sale of the same product through different retailers. In other words, it does not concern inter-brand 
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competition). Other authors also treat these MFC clauses mainly as vertical restraints; see eg Zimmer and 
Blaschczok (n 19); van der Veer (n 19); Vandenborre and Frese (2015) (n 19). 
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The implication of the discussion concerning the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
restrictions is that if platform MFC clauses are found in contexts in which the restriction of 
competition law is a vertical one ± and the decisional practice suggests that it mostly is ± then 
the application of competition law to these clauses needs to consider that specific context. 
This means that, in the EU, these agreements would need to be assessed under the exemption 
provided by VBER. More importantly, in any jurisdiction that incorporates modern economic 
thinking into its competition law assessment, one has to incorporate a market power analysis 
in the examination of these clauses and the agreements in which they are found due to the 
important distinction between restrictions of intra-brand competition and restrictions of inter-
brand competition. 
 
iii. Are they non-exemptible hard-core restraints under VBER Article 4(a)? 
Vertical agreements are block-exempted from the application of Article 101 provided that 
they meet certain criteria.197 Under Article 4(a) VBER, the exemption provided for in VBER 
does not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in 
FRPELQDWLRQ ZLWK RWKHU IDFWRUV XQGHU WKH FRQWURO RI WKH SDUWLHV KDYH DV WKHLU µREMHFW¶ WKH
UHVWULFWLRQ RI WKH EX\HU¶V DELOLW\ WR GHWHUPLQH LWV VDOH SULFH ZLWKRXW SUHMXGLFH WR the 
possibility of the supplier to impose a maximum sale price or recommend a sale price, 
provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure 
from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties.198 On the possible application of this 
exclusion to platform MFC clauses, as Bundeskartellamt noted in HRS, on a technical reading 
of Article 4(a), the conditions of that provision are not fulfilled (meaning that the restraints 
are not non-exemptible)LIWKHKRWHOVDUHµVXSSOLHUV¶DQGWKHSlatformVDUHµEX\HUV¶LWLVWKHQ
not the buyers whose freedom to set price is restrained by the MFC clauses, but the 
µsuppliers¶ (hotels).199 If the hotel portals (ie platforms) are suppliers, then the hotels are 
buyers of these services, but WKH\ GR QRW µUHVHOO¶ WKH VHUYLFHV RI WKH SRUWDOV200 Therefore, 
Article 4(a) does not appear to cover the platform MFC clauses in question.  
 
Arguably, the competitive impact of MFC clauses is similar to that of a hard core restriction 
under Article 4(a), since the aim of that provision is to preserve the price setting freedom of 
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WKH µEX\HU¶201 Indeed, the Verticals Guidelines note that RPM can be achieved through 
indirect means, one of which is by linking the prescribed resale price to the resale prices of 
competitors.202 Moreover, direct or indirect price fixing can be made more effective when 
FRPELQHGZLWKPHDVXUHVZKLFKPD\ UHGXFH WKHEX\HU¶V LQFHQWLYH WR ORZHU WKHUHVDOHSULFH
such as the supplier obliging the buyer to apply an MFC clause.203 This runs into the problem, 
DV DERYH WKDW WKH SODWIRUPV GR QRW µEX\¶ IURP WKH VXSSOLHUV LQ RUGHU WR µUHVHOO¶ and the 
VXSSOLHUV GR QRW µUHVHOO¶ DQ\ VHUYLFHV WKDW WKH\ UHFHLYH IURP WKH SODWIRUPV Thus, even if a 
platform were deemed to be a supplier (of a service) and the sellers on the platform were 
WUHDWHG DV µEX\HUV¶ LQ WKH VHQVH RI $UWLFOH D 9%(5 WKH platform MFC clauses at issue 
would still not be covered under Article 4(a) VBER.204 This is because Article 4(a) VBER 
concerns the resale of the purchased goods/services, whereas platform MFC clauses are used 
to set the price of products/services sold on the platform (which are not being resold by 
platforms) rather than the price for the platform services itself.205 Thus, should platform MFC 
clauses be assessed under VBER, they would not legally fall under Article 4(a) implying that 
they are not non-exemptible hard-core restrictions. 
 
iv. Are they restrictions by object or by effect? 
Another question that one needs to address regarding the treatment of these clauses under 
Article 101 is whether they are restrictions by object or by effect. Similar to the assessment of 
whether they are horizontal or vertical agreements, different authorities around the world 
have come to different conclusions about whether they are restrictions by object or by effect. 
 
In the US case against Apple, the conduct at issue was treated as a horizontal price fixing 
conspiracy subject to the per se prohibition (which in the EU would roughly suggest a 
restriction by object). In its appeal, Apple opposed this categorisation by arguing that 
µ>U@HVRUWWRSHUVHUXOHVLVFRQILQHGWRUHVWUDLQWV«WKDWZRXOGDOZD\VRUDOPRVWDOZD\VWHQGWR
UHVWULFW FRPSHWLWLRQ¶ µKDYH PDQLIHVWO\ DQWLFRPSHWLWLYH HIIHFWV¶ DQG ODFN µDQ\ UHGHHPLQJ
virtue¶.206 The dissenting opinion in Apple also seems to share the same position.207 
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Moreover, Apple argued that the prices in question were price caps which restricted prices as 
µSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWH[FHVVLYHO\KLJKSULFHVWKDWFRXOGHLWKHUDOLHQDWH>$SSOH¶V@customers or 
VXEMHFW >LW@ WR ULGLFXOH¶208 In the commitments offered by Apple and the same publishers 
subject to the US antitrust procedure explained above, the Commission also expressed its 
preliminary findings and assessment of the infringement as being one of a concerted practice 
by object.209 As noted above, it is not entirely clear whether this is a horizontal or vertical 
concerted practice, or a mix of the two. Similarly, in the UK, in its preliminary assessment, 
the OFT treated the restrictions on discounting (and indirectly, the MFC clauses which had 
the same effect) imposed by certain hotel chains in their contracts with OTAs as restrictions 
by object.210  
 
In contrast, other authorities have treated platform MFC clauses as restrictions by effect. For 
example, this was the approach of the CC in PCW.211 In Germany, in HRS, the 
Bundeskartellamt left open the question whether the MFC clauses are restrictions by 
object.212 The Bundeskartellamt found that there were significant restraints of competition by 
effect and pursued the case accordingly.213  
 
7KH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µUHVWULFWLRQV E\ REMHFW¶ DQG µUHVWULFWLRQV E\ HIIHFW¶ DULVHV IURP WKH
fact that certain types of collusion can be regarded, by their very nature, to be injurious to the 
proper functioning of normal competition.214 The test adopted by the CoJ regarding 
UHVWULFWLRQVE\REMHFWLVWKDWWKHUHVWULFWLRQVKRXOGHQWDLOµE\LWVQDWXUH¶µLQLWVHOI¶ µDVXIILFLHQW
degree RIKDUPWRFRPSHWLWLRQ¶215 These restrictions have such a high potential for negative 
effects on competition that it is unnecessary to demonstrate any actual or likely effects on the 
market for the purposes of applying Article 101.216 This is due to the serious nature of the 
restriction and experience showing that such restrictions are likely to produce negative effects 
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on the market and to jeopardise the objectives pursued by the EU competition rules.217 
Considering the economics literature discussed in section II above, regarding both the 
potential for procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of these clauses as well as the 
underdeveloped nature of the state of economics on platform MFC clauses and the lack of 
experience concerning these clauses, it is impossible to reach the conclusion that platform 
MFC clauses should be deemed as restrictions of competition by object.218 It has now been 
officially accepted by at least four European NCAs (UK, France, Sweden, Italy) that some 
types of platform MFC clauses (ie those that seek parity between the price on the platform 
DQGWKHSULFHRQWKHVXSSOLHU¶VRZQRQOLQHFKDQQHOVDUHnecessary for the platform business 
model to function and are acceptable under competition law.219 When so much depends on 
context and the operation as well as the wording of the clause, and when it is accepted that 
certain types of these clauses are necessary for a legitimate business model to function, it is 
impossible to state that these clauses should be treated as restrictions by object because they 
DUH µE\ WKHLU QDWXUH¶ KDUPIXO WR FRPSHWLWLRQ. Therefore, platform MFC clauses require an 
effects-based analysis under Article 101. 
 
B Assessment as an abuse of a dominant position 
Compared to the assessment of platform MFC clauses under Article 101, their treatment 
under Article 102 may be legally more appropriate and sound. This option has not been tried 
in any of the recent cases concerning platform MFC clauses at NCA level. Yet, there are 
several reasons for which approaching these clauses using Article 102 is superior to using 
Article 101 and this section provides a normative analysis of such an approach. The first and 
most pragmatic reason to prefer Article 102 is that the agency problem that occurs under 
Article 101 would be avoided if the assessment is conducted under Article 102 since there is 
QR QHHG WR LGHQWLI\ DQ DJUHHPHQW RU FRQFHUWHG SUDFWLFH EHWZHHQ WZR µXQGHUWDNLQJV¶ DV
defined by EU competition law) for the application of Article 102. The single economic 
entity doctrine limiting the application of Article 101 is not applicable in case of Article 102. 
In fact, the CoJ has explicitly held that a practice to which Article 101 is not applicable due to 
the single economic entity doctrine may still be challenged as an abuse under Article 102.220 
Second, and more importantly, an assessment under Article 102 shifts the focus of the inquiry 
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to the existence and exercise of market power. The existence of market power is not only 
important for the assessment of vertical restraints given the economics of vertical restraints, it 
also appears to be the correct basis for establishing when platform MFC clauses may harm 
competition. Particularly, if these restraints appear to be restricting intra-brand competition, 
economics suggests that for the effects on competition to be harmful, inter-brand competition 
should be weak.221 Thus, it might be that only where inter-brand competition is weak on at 
least one side of the market due to concentration on the market, these clauses might be 
harmful to competition under an effects-based analysis. In fact, all of the cases discussed in 
this article suggest or demonstrate the existence of potential market power on at least one side 
of the relevant two-sided market.  
 
For example, in HRS, while noting that the anticompetitive effects of MFC clauses of HRS 
on competition are exacerbated by the application of MFC clauses by other portals, such as 
Booking.com and Expedia, it is stated that the three OTAs reach a market share of roughly 
90% in Germany on the hotel portal market.222 Indeed, given that individual hotels have 
permitted rooms to be sold more cheaply elsewhere and have been expelled from the HRS 
site,223 this begs the question why any of the hotels would want to stay on the HRS site if 
+56 LV QRW D µPXVWKDYH¶GRPLQDQWSOD\HU. Clearly, in the German scenario HRS does not 
seem to envisage or be threatened by all hotels pulling out of the platform, which suggests 
WKDWHLWKHU+56LVDµPXVWKDYH¶GRPLQDQWSOD\HUand/or there is insignificant buyer power or 
a coordination problem within buyers (ie they cannot all pull out at the same time). This 
suggests that these platforms might be FULWLFDO µJDWHZD\V¶ WR WKH UHOHYDQW PDUNHW ,W LV DOVR
noteworthy, as mentioned above, that the Bundeskartellamt decision is only addressed to 
HRS and not to HRS and its hotel partners or to HRS and other portals implying that what is 
at issue is unilateral conduct. In the UK, the OFT decision was addressed to the OTAs and a 
hotel chain, rather than to either of these on their own. However, the hotel chain in question 
(IHG) is the largest hotel company in the world (by number of rooms), and Booking.com and 
Expedia together may have market power on the relevant market in the UK. Thus, there could 
be market power and/or dominance on at least one side of the market in the UK as well. In 
fact, in its decision, WKH2)7QRWHGWKDWWKHUHOHYDQWPDUNHWLVµOLNHO\WREHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\
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VLJQLILFDQWOLPLWVWRSULFHFRPSHWLWLRQDQGEDUULHUVWRHQWU\¶224 This suggests the existence of 
market power on the relevant market.225 It should be noted that the OFT does not seem to 
have considered the possibility of MFC clauses potentially breaching Article 102 since the 
only reference they make in this context is to a potential breach of Article 101 by restrictions 
on discounting.226 In contrast, the CC examined concentration and market power in the PCW 
market and held that it was the horizontal market power that allowed the PCWs to negotiate 
effective MFC clauses.227 In fact, the CC noted that PCWs appear to enjoy a degree of market 
power by virtue of single-homing consumers and the negotiation and enforcement of MFC 
clauseV ZLWK LQVXUHUV LV RQH µXVH RI WKLV PDUNHW SRZHU¶228 Finally, in the cases involving 
publishers and Apple on both sides of the Atlantic, the publishers involved collectively had 
significant market shares on the relevant market. The five publisher defendants and Random 
House represented the six largest publishers of trade books in the US (the Big Six) and titles 
from these publishers accounted for over 90% of all US New York Times Bestseller book 
sales in 2010.229 The publishers sold over 48% of all e-books in the US in the first quarter of 
DQGRQWKHUHWDLOVLGH$PD]RQµGRPLQDWHG¶WKHH-book retail market, selling nearly 90% 
of all e-ERRNV WKURXJK  XQWLO $SSOH¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH PDUNHW230 Thus, in this case, 
possibly both sides of the two-sided market were concentrated.  
 
Regarding the treatment of platform MFC clauses under Article 102, clearly a hurdle that 
would not exist for their assessment under Article 101 is the requirement to establish that 
there is a dominant position on the relevant market. It should be noted that this dominant 
position does not have to be held by a single undertaking and one can envisage there being a 
position of collective dominance in these cases. For example, it might be that OTAs, 
insurance PCWs, or publishers collectively occupy a dominant position in the markets for 
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OTAs, insurance PCWs or publishing. Subsequently, the imposition of MFC clauses on their 
trading partners can be considered an exercise of such collective dominance that could 
potentially be abusive. Alternatively, a collectively dominant position may exist vertically in 
the relevant markets: it might be that, for example, the publishers and Apple, or the OTAs 
and IHG together occupy a collectively dominant position. The possibility of platform MFC 
clauses constituting the abuse of a collectively dominant position provides a more legally 
sound option for assessing such clauses under competition law than approaching them under 
Article 101. 
 
In EU competition law, a joint (collective) dominant position consists in a number of 
undertakings being able together, in particular, because of factors giving rise to a connection 
between them, to adopt a common policy on the market and act to a considerable extent 
independently of their competitors, their customers, and ultimately consumers.231 
Importantly, the undertakings holding a joint dominant position can be in a vertical 
commercial relationship with each other.232 Mere independence of undertakings from one 
another does not prevent the possibility of their holding a joint dominant position.233 What is 
UHTXLUHG IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH RI FROOHFWLYH GRPLQDQFH LV µHFRQRPLF OLQNV¶ XQLWLQJ such 
independent entities that together hold a dominant position on a specific market.234 According 
to the CoPPLVVLRQ VXFK HFRQRPLF OLQNV PD\ EH VDWLVILHG E\ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI WKH µNLQG RI
LQWHUGHSHQGHQFHZKLFKRIWHQFRPHVDERXWLQROLJRSROLVWLFVLWXDWLRQV¶235  
 
In Compagnie maritime belge the CoJ confirmed that the existence of an agreement or of 
other legal links is not indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant position.236 Such a 
finding may be based on other µconnecting factorV¶ and would depend on an economic 
assessment, and particularly, on an assessment of the structure of the relevant market.237 
According to the Court, collective dominance implies that a dominant position may be held 
by two or more economic entities legally independent of each other if from an economic 
point of view they present themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective 
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entity.238 Thus, it has been argued that it is possible for firms to be held to be collectively 
dominant where the oligopolistic nature of the market is such that they behave in a parallel 
manner, thereby appearing to the market as a collective entity.239 The essence of collective 
dominance is thus parallel behaviour within an oligopoly.240 It is at least arguable that there 
existed collective dominance on the markets scrutinised for platform MFC clauses discussed 
in this article. It is explicit that regarding OTAs, all major OTAs have the same MFC clauses 
in their contracts with the hotels aVZHOODVWKHVDPHµ%HVW3ULFH*XDUDQWHH¶WRFRQVXPHUV;241 
all major PCWs have the same MFC clauses in their contracts with insurers;242 and all of the 
publishers had the same MFC clauses in their contracts with e-book retailers.243 Notably, all 
of these markets are also oligopolistic with around three or four major operators (with the 
exception of the publishers market in Apple with six operators).  
 
Undertakings occupying a joint dominant position may engage in joint or individual abusive 
conduct; it is sufficient that abusive conduct relates to the exploitation of the joint dominant 
position which the undertakings hold on the market.244 However, what qualifies as an abuse 
of collective dominance is underdeveloped in the case law.245 Parallel behaviour in itself is 
not abusive.246 The platform MFC clauses discussed in this article might be the prime 
example of an abuse of collective dominance as discussed below. There is indeed also 
jurisprudence from the CoJ finding that clauses imposed by a dominant undertaking on its 
agents may constitute abuse.247 This could potentially be reversed to apply to the situation of 
the platforms where the agent imposes abusive conditions on its principal if dominance is 
found on the agent-side of the market. 
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The abuse of a dominant position under EU competition law is usually considered to 
FRPSULVHµH[SORLWDWLYH¶DQGµH[FOXVLRQDU\¶DEXVH:KHUHDVH[SORLWDWLYHDEXVHUHIHUVWRWKRVH
practices of a dominant undertaking by which the customers of the dominant undertaking are 
disadvantaged, harmed, etc, exclusionary abuse refers to the practices of a dominant 
XQGHUWDNLQJ WKDW KDUP WKH FRPSHWLWLYH SRVLWLRQ RI WKDW XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V ULYDOV248 In terms of 
establishing abuse, in the cases mentioned throughout this article, one could argue that there 
are potentially both exploitative and exclusionary abuses although establishing either an 
exploitative or an exclusionary abuse would suffice for breach of Article 102 under the 
existing jurisprudence.249 
 
First, the MFC clauses appear to be usually imposed on trading partners against their will. For 
example, hotels, insurance companies, Amazon all seem to have objected to the imposition of 
these clauses in their contracts with platforms/suppliers and some have been threatened by 
delisting from the platform/cut off of supply in case of not complying with the clauses.250 
8QGHU$UWLFOHDWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIµXQIDLUWUDGLQJFRQGLWLRQV¶LVDQH[DPSOHRf abuse and 
the imposition of MF& FODXVHV DJDLQVW WKH ZLOO RI WKH SODWIRUPV¶ WUDGLQJ SDUWQHUV PD\ EH
assessed DV VXFKDSUDFWLFH6HFRQG LI (씀 as suggested by the recent cases (? platform MFC 
clauses lead to higher prices for the products in question than would be the case in the 
absence RI VXFK FODXVHV WKHUH PD\ DOVR EH DQ DEXVH RI µXQIDLU SULFLQJ¶ ZKLFK LV DOVR
prohibited by Article 102(a).251 Third, the difference in treatment between trading partners 
that agree to MFC clauses and that do not agree to MFC clauses may constitute a prime 
example of discrimination which puts some trading partners at a competitive disadvantage as 
prohibited under Article 102(c). This would particularly be the case if the trading partners 
discriminated against are prevented from providing the relevant products/services to their 
customers. Fourth, the MFC clauses have the potential to foreclose the market at the platform 
level by hampering the entry of new platforms which cannot gain market share by 
undercutting the incumbent since the MFC clauses prevent this possibility. Fifth, the MFC 
clauses also have the potential to exclude competition at the trading partner level if ± similar 
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to the discrimination scenario ± the unacceptance of or incompliance with MFC clauses of the 
LQFXPEHQWOHDGWRWKHWUDGLQJSDUWQHU¶V exclusion from the market as a result of not being able 
to reach the customer base provided by the incumbent. Both of these instances can be covered 
under Article 102(b) which prohibits the limitation of production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers. In fact, foreclosure appears to be one of the main 
concerns of all competition authorities that have had to recently deal with these clauses.252 
Regarding MFC clauses, as mentioned above, foreclosure has indeed been the concern of the 
EU Commission and Courts in the few cases that exist at EU level.253 Exercise of market 
power has been the concern with MFC clauses in other jurisdictions as well.254 
 
$ILQDOHOHPHQWRIHVWDEOLVKLQJDEXVHXQGHU$UWLFOHFRQFHUQVµREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶,I
the dominant undertaking can prove that its conduct is objectively justified, then its conduct 
would not be found to breach Article 102. According to the case law, DQ µREMHFWLYH
MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ SURYLGHG E\ D GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ IRU an allegedly abusive conduct can 
prevent the finding of an infringement under Article 102.255 Such objective justification can 
take the form of SURYLQJ WKDW WKH GRPLQDQW XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V FRQduct is either objectively 
necessary or is justified due to the efficiencies that it produces which outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects.256 The burden to prove an objective justification by providing all the 
necessary evidence is on the dominant undertaking.257 
 
In the context of platform MFC clauses, an objective justification could take the shape of 
both an objective necessity defence and an efficiency defence. Using the information 
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available from the recent investigations, one could argue that, for example, the MFC clauses 
WKDW VHHN SDULW\ EHWZHHQ D SODWIRUP DQG WKH VXSSOLHU¶V RZQ RQOLQH FKDQQHOV LV REMHFWLYHO\
necessary since if the consumers can always find the same product more cheaply on the 
VXSSOLHU¶V RZQ ZHEVLWH WKLV ZRXOG GHI\ WKH HQWLUH EXVLQHVV PRGHO Rf the platforms in 
question as they would lose credibility in the eyes of consumers. Moreover, if the consumer 
searches for the product on one platform and then makes a purchase on another platform or 
RQWKHVXSSOLHU¶VRZQRQOLQHFKDQQHO both of which free-ride on the advertisement provided 
by the first platform, then the first platform will be deprived of any remuneration for its 
services since its remuneration is any commission that it would earn on any actual sales 
which in turn enables the platform to offer its services to consumers. The necessity and/or 
XVHIXOQHVVRIUHTXLULQJSDULW\EHWZHHQDSODWIRUPDQGWKHVXSSOLHU¶VRZQRQOLQHFKDQQHOV for 
reasons such as preventing free-riding has indeed been accepted by several competition 
authorities in Europe as a justification.258 Another necessity defence might arise from an 
argument that certain platforms offer higher quality services as they provide consumers with 
feedback on products from previous purchasers, with detailed information on the qualities of 
the product in question, etc that enable prospective purchasers to make more informed 
decisions. The MFC clauses imposed by the platforms can be deemed necessary to prevent 
free-riding by lower quality platforms on such additional services provided by higher quality 
platforms. This can also be considered to be an efficiency defence since such free-riding can 
undermine the incentive for the higher quality platforms to invest in these services which 
consumers may find useful and valuable.259 Similarly, one can envisage an efficiency defence 
in the context of a given sector which would be justified by the peculiarities of the industry 
concerning price-setting, etc. According to the Commission, the proof of objective necessity 
requires proving that the conduct is proportionate, and the proof of an efficiency defence 
requires proving that the conduct is indispensable to the realisation of the relevant 
efficiencies and that the conduct does not eliminate effective competition.260 Clearly, the 
existence or absence of an objective justification needs to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, but there are certainly potential objective justifications that the online platforms might 
be able to establish in the scrutiny of their conduct under Article 102. 
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Overall, the abuse of a collective dominant position either individually or collectively or the 
abuse of a single dominant position represents a potentially viable and appropriate legal basis 
for the competition law assessment of platform MFC clauses. This avenue has oddly not been 
explored by any of the competition authorities mentioned in this article thus far and it can 
only be hoped that this will change in future proceedings. It is therefore welcome that ± 
without commenting on the substance of the investigation ± in the recently announced 
investigation into Amazon, the Commission appears to be considering a potential 
infringement of Article 102.261 
 
V Conclusion 
Platform MFC clauses have become a contentious issue for competition law authorities not 
only in Europe, but also around the world. The law in this area is certainly developing whilst 
different authorities are adopting different approaches to the treatment of identical practices, 
sometimes of identical parties whilst applying (practically) identical legal provisions. In order 
for the law in this area to develop in a sound manner, the authority enforcement in these cases 
needs to be based on a principled approach. Currently, there is no such principled approach. 
In the EU, from a competition policy perspective, it can be argued that the EU Commission 
should have taken on the cases concerning OTAs rather than leave them to the NCAs to 
devise a uniform, coherent European approach to the issue of platform MFC clauses.262 
Leaving the application of EU competition law to a novel issue of major economic 
significance to NCAs with their different interpretations of the same rules and their different 
choice of decisional instruments is a suboptimal use of the decentralised enforcement 
mechanism, as demonstrated by the substantive discussion in this article. Bearing in mind 
that platform MFC clauses are also the subject matter of ongoing and potentially upcoming 
cases in Europe as well as in other jurisdictions around the world, there is a risk that the 
piecemeal approach of different authorities around the world will lead to global divergence 
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on the competition law and policy treatment of such clauses. This can have negative effects 
not only on businesses due to the increased costs of compliance and uncertainty, but also on 
consumers if some of the decisions are erroneous (which they might be, if different 
authorities are adopting substantially different approaches and decisions concerning the same 
practice). 
 
This article has sought to provide a principled approach to the issue of platform MFC clauses 
by arguing that the focus of the assessment should shift from the current emphasis on the 
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices to the prohibition of abuse 
of (collective) dominance. The reason for this shift is not least because in the EU (and 
possibly in the US), due to the single economic unit doctrine the agreements between 
platforms and their suppliers are not covered by rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements  
as platforms are tecKQLFDOO\µDJHQWV¶RIWKHVXSSOLHUV. Even if the agency exception was not a 
problem, regarding the European NCA practice, there would still be the issue of pursuing 
proceedings against individual undertakings for anticompetitive agreements or concerted 
practices where the other party to the agreement is not being pursued for an infringement 
whilst no case is being made by the authority involved to justify that choice. This clearly 
raises concerns about the fairness and procedural correctness of the approach. Where there 
are no proceedings against the vertical contracting parties and no allegation that there is 
horizontal collusion between platforms or between the suppliers, the substantive approach of 
using Article 101 and/or its national equivalents in these cases is difficult to justify. 
 
It is noteworthy that most of the markets which have raised issues concerning platform MFC 
clauses contain a few competitors which together hold a substantial share of the relevant 
market. Indeed, in HRS the Bundeskartellamt also found that the implementation of the MFC 
clauses constituted an unfair hindrance of the small and medium-sized hotel partners which 
are dependent on HRS RQ WKH EDVLV RI DEXVH RI µUHODWLYH PDUNHW SRZHU¶.263 Moreover, the 
practice of the European NCAs addressing their decisions to only the powerful platforms 
individually rather than the platforms and their contracting parties also supports the position 
that what is at stake is unilateral conduct. It is striking that HRS is essentially based on an 
exceptional understanding of µagreement¶ under which one undertaking acquiesces to the 
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unilateral policy of another undertaking.264 Indeed, from an economic point of view, it is 
difficult to perceive what the harm to competition can be from the practices of platforms if 
the platforms are not gateways to the customers and if the platforms do not hold some market 
power which enables them to restrict competition by foreclosure at the platform and/or 
trading partner (supplier) level. If the platforms market is competitive or if the suppliers have 
many other ways of reaching consumers DQG WKHVXSSOLHUV¶PDUNHW LVDOVRFRPSHWLWLYH, it is 
hard to imagine how the conduct of individual platforms would be relevant for the state of 
competition. It must be reiterated that the platform MFC clauses ultimately concern intra-
brand competition because they relate to the price and other sales conditions of the same 
product (eg same book, same hotel room, same insurance policy, etc) through different 
outlets (ie different platforms).  
 
All in all, the prohibition of abuse of dominance provides a more appropriate legal tool to 
tackle the competition law problems arising from platform MFC clauses, particularly in the 
context of EU competition law. It is the more fitting provision in terms of the factual context 
as well as the state of economics. Whatever legal provision the authorities choose to use, it is 
important that they adopt a principled approach that provides sufficient legal certainty to the 
undertakings involved or may be involved in such investigations lest they risk chilling 
competition in several industries where such clauses are common practice. It is also crucial 
that the authorities scrutinise these clauses on the basis of their effects rather than their form 
since it is clear that their potential to harm competition is fact-dependent. Although it is 
welcome that the Commission might be on the right track in its recent investigation into 
Amazon at least concerning the choice of legal instrument, the damage to the correct and 
consistent application of competition law across Europe has been done to a degree and can 
only be hoped to be remedied by judicial scrutiny of the authority decisions. Given that many 
of the relevant decisions are commitment decisions which lack any judicial scrutiny, some of 
the damage may be irreparable.  
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